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ABSTRACT 
 
Multimarket competition has become a substantial part of the modern economy. As such, it 
has drawn the attention of academics in both economics and strategy fields. Many studies have 
found empirical evidence of mutual forbearance in several industries, but despite its importance, 
its behavioral roots have not been explored. In my dissertation I integrate the reality of 
boundedly-rational decision makers into the mutual forbearance hypothesis. I apply an outgrowth 
of the behavioral theory of the firm – the shifting focus model of risk taking – to the study of 
competitive behavior. I propose a behavioral model of multimarket competition that focuses on 
corporate strategic decisions - market entry and exit decisions, regardless of entry mode (e.g. 
acquisitions) or exit mode (e.g. divestitures). This approach provides a granular view of changes 
in the business scope of the firms in terms of product and geographic markets served. I test my 
hypotheses in the U.S. property liability insurance industry over a 12-year period (1998-2008).  
I argue that firms follow the mutual forbearance logic as long as their performance goals are 
satisfied. However, under conditions of adversity, firms shift attention to recovering from the 
performance shortfall and their actions deviate from the mutual forbearance predictions. This 
dissertation shows that underperforming firms with abundant slack take longer to forbear, and 
underperforming firms with limited slack start forbearing sooner, as predicted. By bridging 
behavioral and competitive perspectives to the study of market entry and exit decisions, I 
underscore the value of cross-fertilization in strategy research. 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
  
Multimarket competition, “a situation where firms compete against each other simultaneously 
in several markets” (Karnani & Wernerfelt 1985, p. 87) has become a substantial part of the 
modern economy. As such, it has drawn an increased attention of academics in both economics 
and strategy fields (Baum and Greve 2001). The main assumption in multimarket theory is that 
firms avoid competitive attacks against those rivals they encounter across several markets, 
because of their increased interdependence – the so-called mutual forbearance hypothesis 
(Edwards 1955). For example, if firm A attacks B in market X where B is dominant, firm B may 
react not retaliating A in market X, but in market Y, where A has more to lose. Thus, in order to 
avoid the risk of retaliation, firms forbear from attacking each other in order to reap the benefits 
of decreased rivalry (Karnani & Wernerfelt 1985).  
Multimarket contact has been shown to result in a decreased rivalry among competitors, 
reflected in higher prices (e.g. Evans and Kessides, 1994), higher profits (e.g. Piloff 1999), and 
higher growth (Haveman and Nonnemaker 2000). The benefits of having multimarket contact 
also suggest that firms pursue market entry and exit, i.e. to expand and contract its scope of 
businesses, according to the level of multimarket contact with competitors (e.g. Baum and Korn 
1996). In spite of evidence in favor of the mutual forbearance hypothesis with respect to market 
entry and exit, a broad question that arises is: Will firms always forbear from entry into a new 
market or exit from markets because of the threat of retaliation? Or more specifically, my 
research question is:  
What are the boundary conditions of the mutual forbearance hypothesis with respect to 
market entry and exit?  
 12 
The mutual forbearance hypothesis has strong behavioral implications as it predicts how 
managers make entry and exit decisions under conditions of extended interdependence with 
rivals, or essentially, how managers pursue risk under such conditions. For example, entering 
into a target market can be considered a risky decision (Greve, 2000) and exiting from a focal 
market reflects risk aversion (Shimizu, 2007). Such behavioral roots of the mutual forbearance 
hypothesis are not adequately accounted for in the IO-based analysis of competitive dynamics. 
Predicting risk behavior according to firm performance and aspiration levels, the behavioral 
theory of the firm provides a natural contrast with the IO tradition and, therefore presents an 
opportunity to set out and test in the real world alternative hypotheses that are not fully 
consistent with each other.  
This dissertation also acknowledges that research on multimarket competition has more 
extensively explored market entry decisions than exit decisions. Because the behavioral theory of 
the firm has significant value to add to our understanding of exit, I investigate whether and how 
firm performance relative to aspiration level influences the effect of multimarket contact on 
market exit decisions.  
 The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a review of 
multimarket competition research. It begins by describing core concepts and mechanisms in 
multimarket competition. I then review empirical studies on the relationship between 
multimarket contact and competitive behavior, with a particular emphasis on market entry and 
exit. I also provide an overview of studies on the behavioral theory of the firm and corporate 
strategy. The chapter concludes with a discussion of research issues that this dissertation seeks to 
address.  
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Chapter 3 provides a theoretical model of behavioral boundary conditions for the mutual 
forbearance hypothesis with respect to market entry and exit. First, I describe the research model 
and present the definition of multimarket contact. I then develop hypotheses that juxtapose the 
dominant perspective of multimarket competition from IO economics with alternative 
interpretations from the behavioral theory of the firm.  
Chapter 4 describes the contextual setting in which the theoretical model will be tested. First, 
the research requirements and challenges for testing the theoretical model are presented. Next, I 
explain why the U.S. property and liability insurance industry is an appropriate empirical setting.  
Concluding the chapter, I provide a brief description of the industry. 
The methodologies for empirical analyses are introduced in Chapter 5, the results are 
presented in Chapter 6, and the dissertation is concluded in Chapter 7, in which theoretical and 
managerial implications, limitations, and opportunities for future research are discussed. 
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 CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
2.1 Multimarket competition: core concepts and mechanisms 
The theoretical roots of multimarket competition date back in the 1950‟s, coming from 
economics and sociology traditions. The idea that the multiplicity of contacts among firms can 
decrease the intensity of competition was first introduced by Edwards (1955). He hypothesized 
that multimarket rivals are attentive to how competitive moves in a given market impacts 
competition in other markets, and will tacitly coordinate their actions for the mutual benefit of all 
parties. Thus, firms competing with one another in several markets develop an extended 
interdependence in that competitive moves in one market may cause response in other markets. 
Extended interdependence is also known as multimarket contact (MMC) – an important 
construct in multimarket competition. The implication is that as the level of multimarket contact 
increases, the level of rivalry decreases – the so-called mutual forbearance hypothesis. 
In the mutual forbearance logic, multimarket contact creates a deterrence mechanism 
(Karnani & Wernerfelt 1985), since firms are less likely to act aggressively due to the threat of 
retaliation in other markets. This effect has paramount importance because firms that can limit 
competitive pressures, that is to say decrease the level of rivalry, are typically able to earn higher 
rates of return than those that cannot (Porter 1980). 
In their seminal paper, Bernhein and Whinston (1990) developed a game-theoretic model of 
mutual forbearance in which they formalize the conditions for the development of extended 
interdependence among firms. They contend that in situations where markets are identical, firms 
are identical, and technology exhibits constant returns to scale, multimarket contact does not aid 
in sustaining collusive outcomes – the irrelevance result. In other words, a mere agglomeration 
 15 
of equal multimarket contacts alone does not help sustain forbearance. Hence, MMC may 
facilitate cooperation only if some conditions are met. First, it is important the presence of 
asymmetries either between the markets in which the same firms repeatedly interact with one 
another (e.g. asymmetries in rates of growth or decline) or between the firms within and across 
the multiple markets in which they interact (e.g. asymmetries in costs or demands). With 
asymmetries, rivals are motivated to cooperate as each firm expands in markets where it is strong 
and retreats from markets where it is weak. The presence of asymmetries underlies an important 
construct in multimarket competition - spheres of influence. Because not all markets are equally 
important to a given firm, firms may informally recognize the other‟s primacy of interest in 
markets important to the other, hoping that its own interests will be similarly respected. For 
example, firm A will let firm B to dominate an important market for B, hoping that B will let A 
to dominate in an important market for A. 
By extension, repeated interaction is another condition for mutual forbearance. When the 
probability of continuing interaction is high, firms may be able to transfer incentive constraints 
from a market where cooperation is sustainable to another where it is not – the transfer of market 
power mechanism. However, the sustainability of cooperation depends on the credibility of the 
punishment threat, so that firms do not have incentives to deviate from the competitive 
equilibrium. Indeed, one of the main assumptions of the model is that defections are always 
detected and punished – the perfect monitoring condition. In addition, none of the firms should 
be able to gain more from deviating from its punishment strategy that it would subsequently lose 
as a result of its deviation. In sum, it is both the prospect of gains stemming from cooperation 
and the threat of retaliatory punishment in the future that sustain cooperation in the present.  
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New theoretical advances in multimarket competition have refined and expanded the 
Bernheim and Whinston‟s model. Matsushima (2001) has challenged the perfect monitoring 
condition, showing that multimarket contacts can hold collusive equilibrium in place even when 
firms cannot perfectly monitor their rivals. He theoretically proves that the collusive equilibrium 
can be sustained if multimarket contacts make it easier to detect such defections. For example, 
defection is less likely when a focal firm has many multimarket contacts in the focal market, 
because the number of contacts increases the likelihood that the defection can be discovered. 
Another condition that has been challenged is the asymmetry condition. Using game-
theoretical modeling, Spagnolo (1999) proves that, irrespective of whether there are asymmetries 
of any kind, multimarket contact always facilitates collusion when firms‟ objective are concave, 
i.e. firms are risk averse. This may be explained as follows. First, a strictly concave objective 
function makes the strategic interactions interdependent: firms' evaluation of profits in one 
market depends on profits realized in other markets. Second, the expected utility losses from 
simultaneous retaliations in more markets are larger than (the sum of) those from independent 
retaliations. Since incremental losses weigh more heavily than incremental gains when the 
objective function is concave (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), multimarket contact gives firms 
incentives to respect the tacit agreements. Evidently, the effect of multimarket contact is 
strengthened under conditions of asymmetry or any other conditions postulated by Bernheim and 
Whinston (1990).  
Finally, an important condition for mutual forbearance to take place is that firms must have 
internal coordination mechanisms (Jayachandran et al. 1999). As Golden and Ma (2003, 480) put 
it “coordination between firms often requires coordination within firms.” This mechanism 
 17 
ensures that unit managers make decisions consistent with the corporation‟s goals, thus avoiding 
unnecessary cross-market retaliation from rivals.  
The basic model of multimarket competition is shown in Figure 2.1. This figure illustrates 
that the extent to which firms are interdependent affects their competitive decisions which may 
involve aggressive or cooperative behaviors. These decisions may involve changes in price or 
changes in a firm‟s scope of businesses (e.g. Baum and Korn 1996). In this case, the multimarket 
structure is impacted as firms enter and exit from markets. Finally, competitive behavior 
influences organizational outcomes, such as enhanced performance (e.g. Gimeno and Woo 1996) 
or stability in market shares (e.g. Heggestad and Rhoades 1978).  
 
multimarket
contact
recognition of 
multimarket 
contact
outcomes 
(performance, 
market share)
Firm
Market
competitive 
behavior
(entry/exit, price changes)
market entry
market exit
 
Figure 2.1 – Basic model of multimarket competition 
 
In the next section, I review empirical work on this relationship, using a well known 
terminology for extended interdependence: multimarket contact. Multimarket contact is broadly 
defined here as a focal firm‟s encounters with its focal market‟s rivals in markets outside focal 
market. In this conceptualization, multimarket contact is not just another aspect of industry 
 18 
structure, but, rather, is experienced differently by firms with different product and/or geographic 
scopes.  
 
2.2 Multimarket contact and competitive behavior 
 In the next paragraphs, I review empirical studies that examine the relationship between 
multimarket contact and competitive behavior published in the past thirty years. First, I provide a 
broad literature review on multimarket competition, organized in two periods: 1978-1999 and 
1999-2008. For the first period I relied on two articles that summarize past quantitative findings 
(Jayachandran et al., 1999; Korn and Baum, 1999), and for the second period, I conducted a new 
literature search. After broadly reviewing the studies from both periods, I focus on empirical 
studies that examine the main constructs of this dissertation – market entry and exit – which are 
reviewed in turn.  
 
2.2.1 The 1978-1999 period 
Two articles summarize quantitative findings for this period: Jayachandran et al. (1999) and 
Korn and Baum (1999). The former identified twenty studies, whereas the latter identified 
nineteen studies (Table 1).  Thirteen articles figure in both reviews, meaning that Jayachandran 
et al. (1999) cites seven articles not cited by Korn and Baum (1999), and that Korn and Baum 
(1999) cites six articles not cited by Jayachandran et al. (1999), as shown in Table 2.1. A close 
analysis of the non-cited papers offers possible explanations for those papers not being cited in 
the reviews. Jayachandran et al. (1999) only cite journal articles. Consequently, conference 
papers are not cited (Gimeno and Korn 1994; Whitehead 1978). However, the review does not 
cite three studies supporting evidence of mutual forbearance (Cotterill and Haller 1992; Martinez 
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1990; Scott 1991) and one study not supporting it (Strickland 1985). Korn and Baum (1999) does 
not cite studies published in 1999 (Gimeno 1999; Gimeno and Woo 1999), possibly because they 
were available in the same year as the review‟s publication. However, the review does not cite 
five articles featuring important evidence of multimarket competition (Fernandez and Marin 
1998; Jans and Rosenbaum 1996; Parker and Roller 1997; Sandler 1988; Singal 1996). The final 
list of articles contains twenty-five empirical studies, as shown in Table 2.2.  
 
Table 2.1 – Articles featured in literature reviews on multimarket competition (1978-1999) 
 
Articles cited in Korn and Baum 
(1999) and Jayachandran et al. 
(1999) 
Articles cited in Korn and Baum 
(1999) only 
Articles cited in Jayachandran et 
al. (1999) only 
Heggestad and Rhoades (1978) 
Scott (1982) 
Alexander (1985) 
Feinberg (1985) 
Rhoades and Heggestad (1985) 
Mester (1987) 
Barnett (1993) 
Hughes and Oughton (1993) 
Evans and Kessides (1994) 
Gimeno and Woo (1996) 
Baum and Korn (1996) 
Boeker, Goodstein, Stephan, Murmann 
(1997) 
Baum and Korn (1999) 
 
Whitehead (1978) 
Strickland (1985) 
Martinez (1990) 
Scott (1991) 
Cotteril and Haller (1992) 
Gimeno and Woo (1994) 
 
Sandler (1988) 
Singal (1996) 
Jans and Rosenbaum (1996) 
Parker and Roller (1997) 
Fernandez and Marin (1998) 
Gimeno (1999) 
Gimeno and Woo (1999) 
 
Empirical work in both economics and strategy fields captured in the combined list 
presented some conflicting results about the occurrence of mutual forbearance among firms. Five 
studies found results contrary to mutual forbearance hypothesis (Alexander 1985; Mester 1987; 
Rhoades and Heggestead 1985; Strickland 1985; Whitehead 1978). However, twenty studies 
carried out in diverse industry settings found evidence of mutual forbearance (Heggestad and 
Rhoades 1978; Scott 1982; Feinberg 1985; Sandler 1988; Martinez 1990; Scott 1991; Cotteril 
and Haller 1992; Barnett 1993; Hughes and Oughton 1993; Singal 1996; Evans and Kessides 
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1994; Baum and Korn 1996; Gimeno and Woo 1994; Jans and Rosenbaum 1996; Boeker, 
Goodstein, Stephan, and Murmann 1997; Parker and Roller 1997; Fernandez and Marin 1998; 
Baum and Korn 1999; Gimeno 1999; Gimeno and Woo 1999). According to Jayachandran et al. 
(1999), one possible explanation for the lack of support might be the use of cross-sectional rather 
than longitudinal data. Indeed, four out of five studies use cross-sectional settings except for 
Rhoades and Heggestead (1985), all other, and not surprisingly, empirical evidence based on 
longitudinal studies has largely supported the deterrence effect of multimarket contact on the 
intensity of competition.  
 
Table 2.2 – Empirical studies on multimarket competition (1978-1999) 
 
Studies Sample and period Findings 
Heggestad and Rhoades 
(1978) 
Top three bank holding 
companies in 187 banking 
areas, 1966-1972 
 
Greater market share stability in local markets with 
greater MMC 
Whitehead (1978) Florida bank holding 
companies, 1976 
The results were contrary to mutual forbearance 
hypothesis: service changes and loan rates and fees 
higher in markets with high MMC 
 
Strickland (1985) 195 top U.S. manufactures 
in 408 SICs, 1963 
 
The results were contrary to mutual forbearance 
hypothesis: firm profits lower in SICs with higher 
MMC 
Scott (1982) 437 U.S. manufacturers, 
1974 
Interaction between MMC and concentration has a 
significant effect on market share instability 
 
Alexander (1985) Bank holding companies in 
six states, 1975 
The results were contrary to mutual forbearance 
hypothesis: service changes and loan rates and fees 
higher in markets with high MMC. However, quadratic 
interaction effects of MMC and concentration were 
significant 
 
Feinberg (1985) 391 U.S. multiproduct 
firms, 1982 
Higher cost-price margins in industries where MMC 
high; 
Quadratic interaction between MMC and concentration 
 
Rhoades and Heggestad 
(1985) 
1074 banks in 154 U.S. 
markets, 1970-1979 
Lack of evidence of mutual forbearance hypothesis: no 
effect of MMC on ROA, service charges, or loan rates 
and fees 
Mester (1987) 171 savings and loan firms 
in California, 1982 
The results were contrary to mutual forbearance 
hypothesis: 
market share instability, service charges, and loan rates 
and fees higher, and ROA lower, in markets with high 
MMC; 
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When MMC was accompanied by high concentration, 
the intensity of competition was greater 
 
Sandler (1988) 123 U.S. airline markets, 
before (1974-1976) and 
after (1978-1980) 
deregulation 
 
MMC is related positively to rivalry 
Martinez (1990) 100 largest bank holding 
companies, 1984-1989 
Greater stability in size rankings of banks in local 
markets with greater MMC 
 
Scott (1991) 64 U.S diversified firms in 
35 oligopolistic industries, 
1950 
 
MMC leads to better firm performance; diversified 
sellers‟ concentration has its strongest effect on profits 
earned within an industry when MMC among the 
sellers is high 
 
Cotteril and Haller (1992) 20 largest U.S. supermarket 
chains, 1971-1981 
 
Lower market entry rates when the number of other 
large chains in the market already high 
Barnett (1993) Life history of every firm in 
the CPES sector of the 
telephone industry,  
1981-1986 
 
Lower exit rates from state markets with higher MMC. 
Hughes and Oughton 
(1993) 
418 U.K. manufacturers in 
134 three-digit SIC 
industries, 1979 
 
Price-cost margins and industry rate of return on 
capital higher in industries with higher MMC 
Singal (1996) 14 mergers among airline 
companies, 1984-1987 
 
Airlines earned higher yields when MMC higher 
 
Evans and Kessides 
(1994) 
1000 largest U.S. airline 
city-pair routes, 1984-1988 
 
Major airlines set higher fares on routes with higher 
MMC  
Baum and Korn (1996) 40 California commuter 
airlines, 1979-1984 
Lower entry and exit rates from routes where MMC 
with competitors higher; 
interaction between MMC and spheres of influence 
was significant, whereas interaction between MMC 
and concentration was insignificant 
 
Gimeno and Woo (1994, 
1996) 
48 airlines in 3171 U.S. 
city-pair routes, 1984-1988 
 
Major airlines earned higher yields on routes where 
their MMC with competitors higher; Strategic 
similarity moderately increases rivalry 
 
Jans and Rosenbaum 
(1996) 
25 U.S. regional cement 
markets, 1974-1989 
Interaction between MMC and concentration has a 
significant positive effect on price 
 
Boeker, Goodstein, 
Stephan, Murmann (1997) 
286 California hospitals in 
163 product markets 
(services), 1980-1986 
 
Lower exit rates from product markets where MMC 
with competitors higher 
Parker and Roller (1997) U.S. mobile telephone 
industry 
 
Firms set higher prices where MMC higher  
Fernandez and Marin 2221 hotel establishments in MMC has a positive effect on collusion at low levels of 
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In examining mutual forbearance, researchers have measured the intensity of competition 
using different approaches. Some studies infer the operation of mutual forbearance from higher 
profits (Hughes and Houghton 1993; Feinberg 1985; Scott 1982, 1991), higher prices (Evans and 
Kessides 1994; Fernandez and Marin 1998; Jans and Rosenbaum 1996; Parker and Roller 1997), 
higher yields (Gimeno and Woo 1994, 1996; Singal 1996), greater market share stability 
(Heggestad and Rhoades 1978), and greater stability in size rankings (Martinez 1990).  
Rather than examining the outcomes, other studies measure the intensity of competition 
through actual market entry and/or exit behavior (Barnett 1993; Boeker et al. 1997; Baum and 
Korn 1996), applying the mutual forbearance hypothesis in the following way: Firms are less 
likely to enter new markets in which the multimarket contact with incumbents is high, and are 
less likely to exit from current markets in which the multimarket contact is high.  
 
2.2.2 The 1999-2008 period 
Empirical work conducted during this period is shown in Table 2.3. An interesting 
characteristic of this period is that studies move away from traditional industries (e.g. 
(1998) Spain concentration; and a negative effect at high levels of 
concentration 
 
Baum and Korn (1999) 15 California commuter 
airlines, 1979-1984 
Inverted U-shaped relationship between rates of market 
entry and exit and MMC; Interactions (MMC and 
relative MMC, MMC and relative firm size) were 
significant 
 
Gimeno (1999) 48 airlines in 2897 U.S.  
city-pair routes, 1984-1988 
Reciprocal MMCs decreases rivalry (high prices) and 
increases market share sustainability more than 
nonreciprocal MMCs 
 
Gimeno and Woo (1999) 28 airlines in 3000 U.S.  
city-pair routes, 1984-1988  
MMC correlates with economies of scope; MMC have 
a greater effect on prices and performance when they 
occur in markets that share economies of scope 
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manufacturing and banking), examining multimarket competition in empirical settings as diverse 
as the prescription drug industry (Shankar 1999), the software industry (Young et al. 2000), 
newspapers chains (Fu 2003), and fast food chains in Texas (Kalnins 2004). Also, studies look at 
multimarket issues in countries other than the U.S., such as Canada (Li & Chuang, 2001; Li & 
Greenwood, 2004), Japan (Greve 2000, 2006), Norway (Greve, 2008b), and Spain (Fuentelsaz & 
Gomez 2006), and many examine multimarket behavior across countries (Chintagunta & 
Desiraju 2005; Gimeno, Hoskisson, Beal, & Wan, 2005; Yu & Cannella 2007). Broadening the 
scope of multimarket studies has greatly contributed to the field. For example, there is now 
mounting evidence of mutual forbearance in under-researched industries as well as other 
countries, a situation that strengthens the theoretical validity of multimarket constructs and that 
adds more reputation to research on competition in multimarket contexts.  
Similarly to earlier studies, some empirical studies infer mutual forbearance from evidence of 
decreased rivalry or enhanced performance. Findings of these studies do not differ substantially 
from those reported by Jayachandran et al. (1999) and Korn and Baum (1999). In general, the 
evidence of mutual forbearance under conditions of high multimarket contact is still supported, 
in terms of both decreased rivalry (Chintagunta and Desiraju 2005; Shankar 1999) and enhanced 
performance (Fu 2003; Gupta 2001; Li and Greenwood 2004; Pilloff 1999).  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.3 – Empirical studies on multimarket competition (1999-2008) 
 
Studies Sample and period Findings 
 
Korn and Baum (1999) 
 
15 California commuter airlines 
in 105 competitor dyads, 1979-
1984 
MMC may arise more as a result of chance and 
imitation of market choices of high-performing 
competitors than as a result of purposive MMC 
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Pilloff (1999) 6233 U.S. banks, 1992-1995 
 
MMC outside of a reference market lessens 
competition in the reference market and hence 
enhances performance (ROA) of a focal bank 
 
Shankar (1999) 23 entries and 59 incumbent 
responses from the U.S. 
prescription drug industry, 
1970s and the 1980s 
 
A brand‟s introductory marketing spending is 
lower if the entering firm has MMC with the 
incumbents. 
 
Greve (2000) 174 Tokyo-based banks in 20 
geographic markets, 1894-1936 
 
Density dependence, imitation of large firms‟ 
decisions, and momentum are sufficient for 
predicting branch location decisions. 
Organizations are likely to establish multimarket 
contacts with single-market competitors, but 
unlikely to do so with multimarket competitors, 
contradicting the mutual forbearance hypothesis 
  
Haveman and Nonnemaker 
(2000) 
 
321 California savings and loan 
companies in 58 counties, 1977-
1991 
 
Inverted U-shaped relationship between rates of 
market growth and entry and MMC; interaction 
between MMC and market dominance was 
positively significant 
 
Young, Smith, Curtis, 
Grimm, Simon (2000) 
 
152 observations of 20 U.S. 
software firms, 1987-1991 
Less attacks in product markets where MMC with 
competitors higher, and faster retaliation in 
product markets where MMC with competitors 
higher 
 
Gupta (2001) 
 
1738 projects with 8943 bids in 
highway procurement auctions 
in Florida, 1981-1986 
Propensity to collude increases with MMC as 
repeated contacts among firms are found to have a 
positive effect on the winning low bid which leads 
to higher profit. 
 
Li and Chuang (2001) 232 Canadian general insurance 
companies, 
1992-1998  
Multimarket firms‟ performance in a given market 
depends on the number and simplicity of their 
strategic actions – both absolutely and vis-à-vis 
those of others competing in the market unit.  
 
Audia, Sorenson, Hage 
(2001) 
All American shoes 
manufacturing plants, 
1940-1989 
As the degree of multimarket contact increases, 
the likelihood of firm exit declines.  
 
Gimeno (2002) 
 
28 airlines in 3000 U.S.  city-
pair routes, 1984-1988 
Multimarket contacts established by chance have 
the same effect on competition as intentional 
multimarket contacts 
 
Fu (2003) 
 
465 daily newspapers in the 
U.S. midwestern states, 1998 
Evidence of spheres of influence: strong linkage 
between the MMC and reduced circulation 
competition. Also, advertising rates are distinctly  
higher in MMC markets 
 
Stephan, Murmann, 
Boeker, Goodstein (2003) 
 
395 hospitals in California in 
163 product markets (services) 
Inverted U-shaped relationship between rate of 
market entry and MMC; CEO tenure has an effect 
on the relationship: newer CEOs persisted in 
entering the market of their rivals, even at higher 
levels of MMC 
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For instance, Fu (2003) found that newspaper chains reduce circulation competition. From the 
spheres of influence logic, newspaper chains decrease the level of rivalry in non-core markets in 
order to signal subordination to rival chains, expecting the same treatment in their core markets 
Kalnins (2004) 
 
 
 
978 units of 3 fast-food chains 
in Texas,  
1980-1995 
Lower entry rates into locations with same 
franchise branches present (i.e. markets with large 
divisional MMC) 
Li and Greenwood (2004) 
 
276 Canadian general insurance 
companies,  1993-1998  
Main effects: Multimarket competition per se 
results in lower performance.  
Moderators: Resource similarity positively 
moderates the relationship between MMC and 
performance 
MMC between dissimilar firms may fail to deter 
competitive aggression because they have not 
developed familiarity with each other, which 
enables forbearance and raises performance  
 
Chintagunta and Desiraju 
(2005) 
 
Observations on antidepressants 
(Prozac, Zolotf, and Paxil) 
across the U.S., the U.K., 
Germany, France, and Italy 
Evidence of spheres of influence: Market 
interactions in the U.S. market soften competition 
in the Italian market, but make the interactions 
between brands more competitive in the U.K. 
market. 
 
Gimeno, Hoskisson, Beal, 
Wan (2005) 
43 U.S. telecommunications 
firms in 5 countries,  
1985-1995 
 
Domestic market positions of focal firms and prior 
movers influence mimetic international entry 
behavior. 
 
Gimeno, Chen, Bae (2006) 54 US airlines in 4,994 
domestic city-pair markets, 
1979-1995 
Firms faced with intense rivalry reposition 
themselves away from the most similar 
competitors in terms of served markets (those with 
high market overlap) 
 
Greve (2006) 
 
174 Tokyo-based banks, 
1894-1936 
Firms avoid extensions of MMC beyond the 
minimum of 2 contacts 
Firms enter markets with competitors that have 
high intentional contact.  
 
Fuentelsaz and Gomez 
(2006) 
 
77 Spanish savings banks, 1986-
1999, 
34,529 bank-market-year 
observations 
Main effect: There is an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between MMC and market entry rate 
Moderators: The effect of MMC is greater when 
multimarket rivals are more dissimilar, and is 
lesser when contacts are reciprocal.  
Yu and Cannella (2007) 
 
13 largest global automobile 
firms, 27 countries, 1995-2001 
 
The degree of MMC an MNE has with a given 
rival is positively related to its response speed. 
 
Greve (2008b) 
 
329 firms from the insurance 
industry in Norway, 1912-1986 
Defection from mutual forbearance is more likely 
in markets where the focal firm has few 
multimarket contacts since the probability of 
detection is lower in such markets. 
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(Gimeno, 1999). Advertising rates are also found to be relatively higher in MMC markets (Fu 
2003). Pilloff (1999) also reports enhanced firm performance in a longitudinal study of 6,000 
U.S. banks. He found that a firm‟s presence in markets outside the firm‟s core market lessens 
competition, thus leading to enhanced firm performance.  
Of particular importance, recent empirical work has challenged some of the mutual 
forbearance assumptions. For example, in its original conceptualization, the mutual forbearance 
model assumes perfect monitoring, that is to say, defections from the collusive equilibrium are 
always detected and punished (Bernheim and Whinston 1990). However, Matsushima (2001) 
theoretically proved that collusive equilibrium can be held under conditions of imperfect 
monitoring if the likelihood of being discovered is high. Greve (2008b) tested this argument by 
conducting his research in an empirical context with less observable pricing and quality – the 
insurance industry in Norway – and found support for these ideas.  
Another important point about recent research on multimarket competition is that studies 
within strategy field, different than those within IO economics (e.g. Evans and Kessides 1994), 
use information on actual competitive actions to measure competitive behavior, rather than 
inferring mutual forbearance from higher prices, for example. Young, Smith, Curtis, Grimm and 
Simon (2000), providing an empirical test of Chen‟s (1996) propositions, found that under 
conditions of high MMC with competitors, an attack is less likely, but if it occurs, the retaliation 
will be faster. In a large scale study, Yu and Cannella (2007) found similar results among the 
thirteen largest global automobile manufacturers operating in 27 countries. Li and Chuang 
(2001) examined the impact of competitive interaction among multimarket firms at the market 
level, and found that market share in a given market depends on the number and simplicity of 
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their strategic actions – both absolutely and vis-à-vis those of others competing in the market 
unit.  
Market entry and exit, as observable events of competitive behavior (Chen 1996) have been 
extensively investigated. Since this dissertation focuses on the relationship between multimarket 
contact and market entry/exit decisions, empirical research on this relationship is summarized 
and reviewed in the next section. 
 
2.3 Competitive antecedents of market entry and exit 
Table 2.4 presents detailed information about each study on the relationship between 
multimarket contact and market entry/exit: form of relationship, types of markets, moderators, 
empirical setting, and empirical testing issues (MMC‟s level of analysis and scaling, whether 
MMC is weighed by importance, methodology used, and whether hypotheses are supported).  
 
2.3.1 Form of relationship 
Eight studies examine market entry decisions only (Korn and Baum 1999; Greve 2000; 
Haveman and Nonnemaker 2000; Stephan et al. 2003; Fuentelsaz & Gomez 2006; Greve 2006), 
two studies examine market exit decisions only (Barnett 1993; Boeker et al. 1997), and two 
studies examine both market entry and exit decisions (Baum and Korn 1996, 1999). 
Studies have predicted different forms of relationship between multimarket contact and 
market entry/exit. Earlier empirical work has examined the dampening effects of multimarket 
contact on rates of entry and exit (Barnet 1993; Baum and Korn, 1996; Boeker et al. 1997), as 
they hypothesize a negative linear relationship between the constructs. Results support the 
operation of mutual forbearance, since market entry and exit rates decrease as multimarket 
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contact increases. Indeed, the theoretical logic in earlier work has been primarily built on the 
forbearance effect that is created once multimarket contact levels are high. However, it does not 
explain how multimarket structures are created in the first place (Korn & Baum 1999). As 
Stephan et al. (2003, p. 404) put it: “Firms and their managers, not only find themselves in 
multimarket structures, but must construct them as well.” 
In filling this gap, recent studies have proposed a revised relationship between multimarket 
contact and competitive behavior. Studies have consistently found an inverted-U-shaped rather 
than a negative linear relationship between multimarket contact and market entry (Baum & Korn 
1999, Greve 2006; Haveman & Nonnemaker 2000; Stephan et al. 2003; Fuentelsaz & Gomez 
2006), as shown in Figure 2.2. This relationship is characterized by escalation of competition 
below a certain threshold for which the likelihood of competing aggressively reaches its 
maximum, and de-escalation of competition above this threshold, when firms recognize the 
interdependence of their markets, and because of the threat of retaliation, do not engage in 
aggressively competitive behavior. 
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Figure 2.2 – Inverted U-shaped relationship between multimarket contact and competitive 
behavior 
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 Evidently, there are alternative explanations for market entry and exit. Some studies propose 
behavioral models with competing hypotheses in which the initiation and further expansion of 
multimarket contact have antecedents other than the level of multimarket contact (Greve 2000; 
Korn & Baum 1999), and, at the extreme, these decisions can be attributed to chance (Korn & 
Baum 1999). Researchers in this stream draw from organizational ecology, behavioral, and 
institutional theories, and argue that if multimarket contact is such a pervasive construct, it is 
important to examine other causes for its creation and existence.  
Korn & Baum (1999) examines the influence of chance, behavioral, and mimetic processes 
in the creation of multimarket structures. They found that multimarket structures will emerge as 
a result of chance but that subsequent market entry will be determined by mimetic processes. 
Similarly, Greve (2000) examine market entry decision by proposing four competing predictions. 
Market entry decisions can be influenced by density of firms in the focal market (the 
organizational ecology argument), mimetic processes in which firms will seek legitimacy (the 
institutional argument), momentum processes in which firms will repeat behaviors that have 
been successful in the past (the behavioral argument), and mutual forbearance processes in which  
 30 
Table 2.4 – Empirical research on MMC and Market Entry/Exit 
Article Competitive 
behavior 
Form of 
relationship  
Moderators  Types of  
Markets 
MMC level of 
analysis and 
scaling 
MMC 
weighed by 
importance? 
Methodology Hypotheses 
supported? 
Barnett (1993) 
 
Exit 
 
Negative 
linear 
 
 Geographic firm-in-market 
(count) 
No Event history 
analysis 
Yes 
Baum & Korn (1996) 
 
Entry / Exit 
 
Negative 
linear 
 
Market 
dominance 
Geographic firm-in-market 
(percentage) 
No Event history 
analysis 
Yes 
Boeker et al. (1997) 
 
Exit Negative 
linear 
 
 Product 
(hospital 
services) 
firm-in-market 
(percentage) 
No Logistic 
Regression 
Yes 
Baum & Korn (1999) 
 
Entry / Exit Negative 
Curvilinear 
 
Relative size, 
relative MMC 
 
Geographic Dyad (count) No Event history 
analysis 
Yes 
Korn & Baum (1999) 
 
Entry Positive 
Linear 
 
 Geographic Dyad (count) No Event history 
analysis 
No 
Greve (2000) 
 
Entry Positive 
Linear 
 Geographic firm-in-market 
(count) 
 
No Event history 
analysis 
No 
Haveman & 
Nonnemaker (2000) 
 
Entry Negative 
curvilinear 
Market 
dominance 
Geographic firm-in-market 
(proportion) 
No Event history 
analysis 
Yes 
Stephan, Boeker, 
Goodstein, and 
Murmann (2003) 
Entry Negative 
Curvilinear 
 
CEO tenure Product 
(hospital 
services) 
firm-in-market 
(percentage) 
No Logistic 
Regression 
Yes 
Fuentelsaz & Gomez 
(2006) 
Entry Negative 
Curvilinear 
Concentration, 
reciprocity, 
resource 
similarity 
Geographic firm-in-market 
(percentage) 
 
Yes Event history 
analysis 
Yes 
Greve (2006) 
 
Entry Negative 
Curvilinear 
 geographic firm-in-market 
(count) 
No Event history 
analysis 
Yes 
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firms will seek deterrence (the forbearance argument). He found that market entry decisions 
involve momentum and mimetic processes, and mutual forbearance benefits are the least concern 
for decision-makers.  
Interestingly, by focusing on the bottom line of multimarket strategies – the performance 
effect of intentional and unintentional multimarket contacts – Gimeno (2002) was able to 
reconcile both views on the emergence of multimarket contacts. Using the typology of strategies 
developed by Mintzberg et al. (1985), he views the intentional market expansion as a deliberate 
strategy, and the unintentional market expansion determined by chance, as an emergent strategy. 
He examined the influence of these strategies on subsequent performance and found that 
multimarket structures will lead to a higher level of performance, regardless of the type of 
strategy pursued. In other words, the performance effect is determined by the realized strategy. 
 
2.3.2 Moderators 
Equally importantly, studies have also examined whether and how moderators influence the 
relationship between multimarket contact and market entry and exit. Baum & Korn (1996) and 
Haveman & Nonnemaker (2000) found a significant positive moderating effect of market 
dominance on market entry, meaning that the effect of multimarket contact will be stronger in 
markets dominated by a very few firms, which is consistent with IO expectations (Porter 1980).  
Asymmetry in competitors‟ size also has an impact on the mutual forbearance effect. For 
example, Baum and Korn (1999) found that as multimarket contact increases, smaller 
competitors will be less likely to enter and more likely to exit from a larger competitors‟ 
markets. Moreover, asymmetry in a firm‟s level of multimarket contact with a given competitor 
relative to the firm‟s other competitors can also have an effect on the relationship between the 
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multimarket contact and market entry. Specifically, Baum and Korn (1999) found that firms 
direct their competitive efforts towards low multimarket contact competitors as a consequence of 
forbearing from rivalrous actions with competitors with which they have higher multimarket 
contact. Similarly, the operation of the spheres of influence was found significant as the 
reciprocity of contacts amplifies the dampening effect of multimarket contact on market entry 
rates (Fuentelsaz & Gomez 2006). 
Theoretical studies have long emphasized the importance of bringing resource similarity into 
competitive dynamics theory (Chen 1996; Jayachandran et al., 1999), and empirical studies have 
confirmed the significant effects of resource similarity on the relationship between multimarket 
contact and intensity of competition. For example, multimarket contact is more influential on 
competitive actions of firms with dissimilar resources (Fuentelsaz & Gomez, 2006), as the 
information provided by the multimarket contacts might be the only mechanism in achieving 
tacit coordination when interfirm dissimilarity impairs the interpretation of mutual forbearance 
signals.  
 Only one study examines the effects of risk preferences on the mutual forbearance 
hypothesis. Stephan et al. (2003) focus on the role of a firm‟s CEO in pursuing strategic change, 
represented by entry into new markets. They argue that newer and longer-tenured CEOs are 
likely to have different preferences for particular competitive actions. Whereas the former has a 
mandate for change and are less likely to abide by the tacit agreements with competitors, the 
former are more likely to rely on what worked for them in the past. Consequently, longer-tenured 
CEOs would be more sensitive to the implications of multimarket contact than newer CEOs. 
Accordingly, they found support for these arguments.  
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 In sum, current research in market entry and exit have examined the moderating effects of 
independent variables at the market- (market dominance), the firm- (CEO tenure), and the dyad 
levels (relative size, relative multimarket competition, and resource similarity).  
 
2.3.3 Empirical setting 
The majority of studies examines market entry and exit in geographic markets (Barnett 1993; 
Baum and Korn 1996, 1999; Korn and Baum 1999; Greve 2000, 2006; Haveman and 
Nonnemaket 2000; Fuentelsaz and Gomez 2006). Only two studies analyze entry into and exit 
from product markets (Boeker et al. 1997; Stephan et al. 2003), specifically the hospital services. 
It is important to understand the empirical context in which the studies have been conducted. I 
was able to identify characteristics of the industries under observation in seven studies (Barnett 
1993; Baum and Korn 1996, 1999; Korn and Baum 1999; Fuentelsaz and Gomez 2006; Greve 
2000, 2006), but for the remaining studies (Boeker et al. 1997; Haveman and Nonnemaker 2000; 
Stephan et al. 2003), I had to search for authors‟ previous articles.  
Baum and Korn (1996, 1999) tested their hypotheses using data describing city-pair market 
changes of commuter air carriers operating in California from 1979 to 1984. In this period, 
federal deregulation triggered an intense period of reorientation and competitive interaction. 
Fuentelsaz and Gomez (2006) look at entry behavior into new geographic markets in the Spanish 
savings banks industry after industry‟s deregulation – when restrictions to branching were 
eliminated – between 1986 and 1999. They explicitly report that multimarket contact in 1986 
was almost inexistent. Greve (2000, 2006) examine the establishment of Tokyo-based banks in 
20 geographic markets. Haveman and Nonnemaker (2000) use data from the savings and loan 
associations (thrift) operating in California between 1977 and 1991. During this period, thrifts 
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faced deregulatory initiatives that transformed their competitive environment from placid and 
constrained to uncertain and volatile (Haveman 1993). Finally, Stephan et al. (2003) examined 
hospitals in California in the period between 1980 and 1986. This was a particularly turbulent 
period for the U.S. health care sector in which new regulations intensified competition 
(Goodstein, Boeker, and Stephan 1996).   
In sum, although the reviewed studies use data from different time periods and different 
industries (thrifts, savings banking, airlines, hospitals), they have one aspect in common: that the 
industries under observation were experiencing intense regulatory changes and heightened 
competition. 
 
2.3.4 Empirical testing 
 Empirical work on multimarket competition has used different measures of the multimarket 
contact construct, as shown in Table 2.4. The possible levels of multimarket contact measure are 
summarized in Table 2.5: market level, firm-in-market level, and dyad level. A market level of 
multimarket contact captures the level of multimarket contact among all incumbents in a market. 
Such a level of measure reflects the IO economics roots of the multimarket competition 
literature. IO economists have a deep-rooted interest in discovering whether concentration in a 
particular industry poses antitrust dangers to consumers (Scherer and Ross 1980). None of the 
studies use measures at this level of analysis because market-level multimarket contact is an 
industry- rather than a firm-level attribute.  
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Table 2.5 – Levels of Analysis of Multimarket Measures 
Level Notation Definition Cross-level relationship 
Dyad level 
ijmMMC  
Number of markets in which firms 
i and j meet outside focal market 
m 
The most basic level 
Firm-in-market level 
imMMC  
Number of markets in which firm i 
meets all its competitors outside 
focal market m 
 
The sum of dyad level across all 
markets outside focal market m 
Market level 
mMMC  
Number of markets in which all 
firms meet each other outside 
focal market m 
 
The sum of dyad level across all 
firms and markets outside focal 
market m 
 
Firm-in-market level of measure captures a focal firm‟s contact with all its rivals across all 
markets. This level of measure is suitable for studies of the competitive activity of firms within 
specific markets (Gimeno and Jeoung 2001). The majority of studies analyze the effects of 
multimarket contact at the firm-in-market level (Barnett 1993; Baum and Korn 1996; Boeker et 
al. 1997; Greve 2000, 2006; Haveman and Nonnemaker 2000; Stephan et al. 2003; Fuentelsaz 
and Gomez 2006). Dyad level of measures focuses on the competitive interaction between two 
firms, representing the most basic level of analysis (Gimeno and Jeoung 2001). Only two studies 
examine multimarket competition at this level: Baum and Korn (1999) and Korn and Baum 
(1999). Gimeno and Jeoung (2001) argue that the dyadic level may be more appropriate in 
examining actions that are dyadic in nature, such as attack against a specific rival.  
Studies differ in how they capture the level of multimarket contact. In its most basic form, 
multimarket contact describes the count of multimarket contacts that a firm has with incumbents 
outside the focal market (Barnett 1993; Greve 2000, 2006), whereas some studies calculate the 
percentage of multimarket contact, i.e. the ratio of the count of multimarket contacts to the total 
number of markets in which they operate (Baum and Korn 1996; Boeker et al. 1997; Stephan et 
al. 2003; Fuentelsaz and Gomez 2006). To illustrate how the scaling occurs, suppose that a 
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potential entrant to a target market operates in 5 markets. If this potential entrant already 
encounters with one of the target market‟s incumbent in 3 markets, they have a multimarket 
contact of 60%.  The level of multimarket contact would go down to 6% if the focal firm 
operates in 50 markets, and the count measure of multimarket contact would still be 3 in both 
situations.  
According to the mutual forbearance logic, some contacts may be more important than 
others. Hence, some studies weigh the contacts according to their strategic importance in an 
attempt to model how managers weigh their market entry and exit decisions (e.g. Fuentelsaz and 
Gomez 2006). Yet Gimeno and Jeoung (2001) urge researchers to weigh their multimarket 
measures only when there are theoretical grounds, because the use of different scales and 
weights can alter the distribution of the measures. 
Finally, in estimating the effect of multimarket contact on market entry and exit, studies 
have applied two different methodologies: logistic regression modeling (Boeker et al. 1997; 
Stephan et al. 2003) and event history analysis (Barnett 1993; Baum and Korn 1996, 1999; Korn 
and Baum 1999; Greve 2000, 2006; Haveman and Nonnemaker 2000; Fuentelsaz and Gomez 
2006). The use of either methodology does not seem to impact the expected results since the 
inverted-U-shaped curve was found in studies using both types of methods. The differences and 
suitability of these methodologies are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.  
 
2.4 Behavioral antecedents of market entry and exit 
 
Market entry and exit decisions are considered corporate strategic decisions and, as such, are 
in the realm of the most fundamental areas of inquiry in strategic management (Rumelt, 
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Schendel, & Teece, 1994). The behavioral perspective has been applied to the study of such 
decisions. Regarding market entry, Haleblian, Kim, Rajagopalan (2006), using a sample of U.S. 
commercial banking industry, found that acquisition performance positively influenced the 
likelihood of a firm‟s making a subsequent acquisition. Iyer and Miller (2008) examined the 
effect of performance relative to aspiration level – the attainment discrepancy (Lant, 1992) – and 
found that acquisition activity increases as performance rises among firms performing below 
aspiration level, but fall among firms performing above aspiration level in a sample of U.S. 
manufacturing firms.  
Using different terms to define market exit (e.g. sell-offs, spin-offs, divestiture, divestment), 
many studies support a negative relationship between firm performance and exit, in that as firm 
performance decreases, the likelihood of exit increases (Montgomery and Thomas 1988; 
Ravenscraft and Scherer 1991; Chang 1996; Steiner 1997). The main rationale is that external 
pressures in the form of low company profits help break down the divestment barriers. 
While some studies focus on the effect of firm performance, others look at both the business 
unit and firm performance levels. Some studies also analyze relative performance, that is to say, 
the business unit performance related to the core business performance or the core industry 
performance. For example, Duhaime and Grant (1984) found that low competitive and financial 
strength of the business unit relative to industry peers can trigger exit decisions, and Markides 
(1992) found that a firm is more likely to divest business units the higher the profitability and 
advertising intensity of its core industry. However, Cho and Cohen (1997) raise an important 
characteristic of the relationship between units. They argue that because of cross subsidization 
from profitable business units, firms do not sell off poorly performing business units until the 
firm experiences significant underperformance relative to its industry peers.  
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Current research on the relationship firm performance and market exit decisions pay now 
more attention to the interaction effects of performance and other independent variables. Sanders 
(2001), for example, defines firm performance as a situational characteristic that affects the 
divestiture decisions. Observing 250 firms from the Standard and Poor‟s 500 (S&P 500), he 
found that poor performance not only results in negatively framed decisions, but also increases 
the CEO's role in such negative outcomes. Shimizu and Hitt (2005) investigated factors that 
constrain and facilitate divestment of business units as performance decreases. They found that 
factors contributing to organizational inertia (e.g. size and age) delay the divestiture of poorly 
performing acquired units, but factors that decrease organizational inertia (e.g. new CEO) are 
found to accelerate the divestiture of poorly performing units. In a recent study, Shimizu (2007) 
proposes a multi-level model that integrates arguments from three distinct theories: prospect 
theory, behavioral theory of the firm and the threat-rigidity thesis. Studying the divestiture of 
formerly acquired units, he found that these decisions are influenced by psychological and 
organizational factors that increase or decrease the likelihood of divestiture as unit performance 
decreases.  
 
2.5. Conclusion: Gaps in current research and opportunities for future research 
In the next paragraphs, I identify gaps in prior research and explain how this dissertation seeks to 
address them. 
 
2.5.1 Market entry and exit as changes in a firm‟s business scope 
Across all corporate strategy studies reviewed, there is one recurring theme: entry and exit 
transactions involve change in ownership, that is to say, entry implies that firms are being 
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acquired and exit implies that business units are being sold, spun-off, or carved-out and assets 
are being transferred to new owners. Thus, the focus is more on the adjustment in ownership than 
the adjustment in the scope of the firm. Yet the central question posed by theoretical and 
empirical research in corporate level strategy is: “In what product markets and businesses should 
the firm compete?”  
When focusing on ownership changes, one overlooks the possibility that changes in a firm‟s 
business portfolio may not involve transfer of ownership, as firms can enter into new markets or 
exit from markets by internally restructuring. For example, MBNA in England decided to 
withdraw from the consumer lending market, but it has not sold its business unit. Rather, it has 
internally restructured its operations by transferring 400 employees to other areas of the 
company (Gleeson 2007).  
The conceptualization that closely approaches the idea of entry and exit decisions as changes 
in a firm‟s scope is the one adopted in multimarket studies (e.g. Baum and Korn 1996; Gimeno 
and Woo 1996). In this dissertation, every firm is conceived to occupy a market domain, defined 
as “the set of markets in which a firm operates” (Baum and Korn 1996, p. 256). This definition is 
aligned with D‟Aveni‟s (2001, p. 4) definition of a firm‟s business portfolio as a “geo-product 
portfolio, consisting of geo-product markets”. A company‟s geo-product portfolio represents “the 
company‟s position on the competitive space delineated by geographies and by the company‟s 
products and services” (D‟Aveni 2001, p. 4).  This definition of market provides a granular view 
of the changes in the scope of the firm in terms of product and geographic markets served. 
Consistent with this definition, market entry is defined as the inclusion of a new market into a 
firm‟s portfolio, regardless of how entry is pursued (e.g. acquisition or internal development), 
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and market exit is conceptualized as the withdrawal from a given market, regardless of how exit 
is pursued (e.g. sell-off, dissolution, internal restructuring, etc).  
 
2.5.2 The overlooked argument in corporate strategy literature 
Few strategic decisions draw so much attention from the corporate world and can have such 
an influence on a firm‟s success as corporate diversification decisions. Accordingly, the 
relationship between diversification and firm performance as well as the investigation of its 
antecedents are at the core of much of corporate strategy research (Palich, Cardinal, Miller, 
2000).  
In line with arguments first advanced by Penrose (1959) and Teece (1982), most research 
emphasizes the role of internal determinants of diversification, such as firm-specific resources 
and capabilities (e.g. Miller, 2004; Farjoun, 1998; Markides and Williamson 1996; Robins and 
Wiersema 1995). However, the influence of the competitive context on diversification decisions 
is also a noteworthy factor (Gimeno, Hoskisson, Beal, and Wan, 2005). For instance, 
profitability in a focal business depends not only on a firm‟s economies of scope, but also on its 
rivals‟ economies of scope and its competitive interaction with their rivals (Gimeno and Woo, 
1999; Li and Greenwood, 2004). Hence, this dissertation seeks to fill this gap by focusing on the 
competitive antecedents of corporate strategic decisions. 
 
2.5.3 A behavioral perspective of multimarket competition  
Research in multimarket competition has been instrumental in bringing the competitive 
context into diversification and divestiture decisions. However, because of its IO roots, 
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multimarket research does not examine how changes in the risk preference of decision makers 
influence the competitive behavior of multimarket firms.  
Except for a few studies that adopt a behavioral approach to multimarket competition (e.g. 
Greve 2000; Korn and Baum 1999; Stephan et al. 2003), the role of managers in multimarket 
competition has been largely ignored. For instance, Gimeno (2002) emphasizes that future 
research needs to investigate the antecedents and motivations to establish and expand 
multimarket contact. Korn and Rock (2001) are even more emphatic by saying that “in order to 
move multimarket theory forward, empirical work must begin to penetrate the “black box” of 
managerial decision-making in multi-market environments.”  
If the research objective is to explain and understand the actual behaviors of individual firms 
as they interact with competitors, a behavioral perspective of multimarket competition may have 
distinct advantages. Hence, I argue that multimarket competition research can be greatly 
enhanced if it incorporates the reality of bounded rationality of decision-makers. Predicting risk 
behavior according to firm performance and aspiration levels, the behavioral theory of the firm 
provides a natural contrast with the IO tradition and, therefore presents an opportunity to set out 
and test in the real world alternative hypotheses that are not fully consistent with each other.  
Although the behavioral perspective has recently been applied to the study of corporate 
strategic decisions (e.g. Haleblian, Kim, Rajagopalan, 2006; Iyer and Miller, 2008), I propose a 
theoretical model that explicitly integrates behavioral and competitive perspectives to the study 
of market entry and decisions. My behavioral model of multimarket competition is presented in 
the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 3 – THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
 
 This chapter develops a research framework for understanding the impact of behavioral 
contingencies on the mutual forbearance hypothesis, proposing a behavioral model of 
multimarket competition that focuses on market entry and exit behavior. It begins by describing 
the theoretical model, its elements and links. Next, I present the core constructs from the 
behavioral theory of the firm – firm performance and organizational slack – and how they impact 
risk behavior. Finally, I develop hypotheses for the impact of performance and organizational 
slack on the mutual forbearance hypotheses for market entry and market exit.  
 
Figure 3.1 – Theoretical model: Elements and links 
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Figure 3.1 presents the elements and links of the theoretical model. The solid lines are the 
links explored in this dissertation, whereas the dashed lines are featured for completeness of the 
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model. The core element of the model is the scope decision with respect to market entry and exit. 
Firms expand and contract their scope according to the level of multimarket contact, 
performance relative to aspiration level, and organizational slack. The mutual forbearance logic 
focuses on the relationship between multimarket contact and scope decisions, and my 
dissertation examines the moderation effect of performance relative to aspiration level and 
organizational slack on that relationship. Although I acknowledge that market entry and exit 
subsequently impact firm‟s performance, I do not explore this relationship in my dissertation.   
 
3.1 Performance relative to aspiration level, slack, and risk taking 
The relationship of a firm‟s performance to its aspiration levels of performance functions as a 
“master switch” that affects a wide range of organizational behaviors (Greve, 2003). The 
behavioral theory of the firm predicts that when firm performance is above the aspiration level, 
increases in firm performance lead to decreases in risk taking (Cyert & March, 1963). While 
these effects have been supported empirically, the effects of performance below aspiration level 
still remain under debate (Wiseman & Bromiley, 1991; March & Shapira, 1987; Ocasio 1995). 
The behavioral theory predicts that when firm performance is below aspiration level, decreases 
in firm performance lead to increases in risk taking (Cyert and March 1963). In contrast, some 
researchers argue that performance below aspiration level is perceived as a threat, and that such a 
perception makes decision makers rigid and unable to generate risky courses of action (Staw, 
Sandelands, Dutton, 1981) – the so-called threat-rigidity thesis. In other words, low performance 
induces risk aversion. 
Attempting to reconcile these conflicting predictions for performance below aspiration level, 
March and Shapira (1987, 1992) propose a model of risk taking that considers shifts in focus of 
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attention by managers. As they put it, “understanding action in the face of incomplete 
information may depend more on ideas about attention than on ideas about decision (p. 1412).” 
Building upon a large body of literature in psychology of risk taking (e.g. Atkinson 1954; Lopes 
1987) and decision theory (e.g. Tversky 1972), they contend that risk preference varies with 
context, which is highly subject to managerial interpretation. Their model is based on two 
reference points: the aspiration level and the survival level. They propose that managers first 
attend to the level of performance relative to the aspiration level, or the attainment discrepancy 
(Lant 1992). When performance is above aspiration level, managers are more likely to be risk 
averse, which is consistent with the behavioral theory. However, when performance is below 
aspiration level, managers will be either risk averse or risk seekers according to the survival 
level, which is the point at which a firm‟s resources are exhausted. If the current performance is 
below aspiration level but well above the survival point, the opportunities to fill the gap between 
a low performance and the aspiration level are more salient than the dangers associated with risk 
taking. Thus, decreases in performance lead to risk taking, which is again consistent with the 
behavioral theory. On the other hand, when current performance is close to the survival point, the 
dangers associated with risk taking become more salient than its opportunities, preventing 
managers from pursuing risk. Thus, decreases in performance lead to risk aversion, which is 
consistent with the threat-rigidity thesis (Staw et al. 1981). 
The rules that govern the shift in the focus of attention between a survival point and an 
aspiration level are an important aspect of the model. March and Shapira (1992) suggest that 
slack resources can be drivers of focusing attention on the opportunities rather than on the 
dangers. Large organizational slack lowers the survival point, whereas low slack raises it. Hence, 
the distance between the aspiration level and the survival point for firms with large 
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organizational slack is greater than the distance for firms with low organizational slack.  
Consequently, managers in resource-rich firms are more likely to perceive performance below 
aspiration level as a repairable gap; therefore, in such conditions, performance below aspiration 
level increases risk taking, which would be predicted by the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert 
and March 1963). Conversely, managers in resource-poor firms perceive low performance as a 
threat to firm survival (Audia & Greve, 2006), thus inducing risk aversion, which would be 
predicted by the threat-rigidity hypothesis (Staw et al. 1981).  
In sum, the literature allows us to make predictions for each of the performance/slack 
categories: (a) firm performance below their aspiration level and high slack, (b) firm 
performance below their aspiration level and low slack (c) firm performance above aspiration 
level. In the following sections, I integrate the behavioral theory of the firm into the multimarket 
theory, proposing a behavioral model of multimarket competition that focuses on market entry 
and exit behavior. 
 
3.2 Market Entry 
Considered a strategic move, market entry is a risky decision, since it requires substantial 
resource commitment and is more difficult to reverse (Chen and MacMillan 1992; Miller and 
Chen 1994; Smith, Grimm, Gannon, and Chen 1991). In this section, I first present the mutual 
forbearance null hypothesis for market entry in order to make the theoretical model complete, 
and then develop three hypotheses. Each hypothesis addresses one of the possible 
performance/slack categories: performance below aspiration level and high slack, performance 
below aspiration level and low slack, performance above aspiration level, irrespective of slack 
resources.   
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3.2.1 The mutual forbearance null hypothesis for market entry 
The Industrial Organization perspective assumes that firms maximize a profit function while 
taking into account the likely strategies of rivals (Scherer and Ross, 1980). If they are at all 
perceptive, firms recognize that their pricing decisions are interdependent and their profits are 
higher when they coordinate their prices than when they pursue their own self-interest (Tirole, 
1988). Consequently, firms are motivated to engage in joint-profit maximizing strategies through 
mutual forbearance (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990). In terms of risk preference, the mutual 
forbearance logic suggests that a firm‟s risk preference varies with its level of interdependence 
with rivals or the competitive context in which the firm is embedded. At low levels of 
multimarket contact, the threat of retaliation by rivals is minimal. Consequently, firms are 
motivated to pursue risk. However, as the interdependence increases, firms change their risk 
preference and avoid risk, thus forbearing from rivalry. Thus, the mutual forbearance logic 
applied to market entry decisions assume that firms enter new markets at low levels of 
multimarket contact.  In order words, there is a negative relationship between multimarket 
contact and risk preference.  
This theoretical logic has been primarily built on the forbearance effect that is created once 
multimarket contact levels are high. However, to create this deterrence capability, firms must 
establish multimarket contact with their rivals (Korn and Baum, 1999). Hence, in the context of 
market entry decisions, the recent mutual forbearance logic that emerges from empirical studies 
proposes an inverted-U relationship between multimarket contact on one hand, and risk 
preference with respect to market entry on the other (Baum and Korn, 1999; Haveman and 
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Nonnemaker, 2000; Stephan et al., 2003; Fuentelsaz and Gomez, 2006). This relationship is 
depicted in Figure 3.2 and set out as the mutual forbearance null hypothesis for market entry: 
Hypothesis 0a (H0a): There will be an inverted-U-shaped relationship 
between a firm’s level of multimarket contact with its rivals and a firm’s rate 
of market entry.  
 
Figure 3.2 – The Mutual Forbearance Null Hypothesis for Market Entry 
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The two parts of the curve describe the two sides of competitive interaction: the creation of 
deterrence capability and the operation of forbearance. The inflection point indicates the 
threshold of multimarket contact at which risk preference shifts from risk seeking to risk 
avoidance: Below the threshold, firms are likely to pursue risk, and above the threshold, they are 
likely to avoid risk. From an IO standpoint, this curve also represents the best combination of 
risk avoidance and risk seeking behaviors that lead to maximization of profits (Edwards, 1955). 
The IO logic assumes that firms abiding by the tacit agreements with rivals benefit from 
decreased rivalry and, consequently accrue greater profitability (Porter, 1980).  
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To integrate the behavioral logic into the forbearance logic I articulate how the three 
predictions for performance relative to aspiration level impact the mutual forbearance logic (i.e. 
the mutual forbearance null hypothesis). I develop three hypotheses that demonstrate how firm 
performance feedback moderates the relationship between multimarket contact and market entry 
decisions. An illustration of the hypothesized effects is provided in Figure 3.3. The mutual 
forbearance null hypothesis (H0a) is represented as the dashed curve. The moderating effect of 
performance relative to aspiration level and slack is represented as the skewed curve. The 
skewed curves depict the competitive interactions after the introduction of bounded rationality 
into the rational logic of the mutual forbearance hypothesis.  
 
3.2.2 Performance below aspiration level and high slack 
Abundant-slack firms performing below aspiration level are likely to take more risks than 
limited-slack firms (March and Shapira, 1987, 1992). In taking more risks, they will consider 
alternative strategies (Zajac, Kraatz, and Bresser,  2000) in order to reduce or eliminate the 
discrepancy between current performance and the aspiration level. Indeed, evidence suggests that 
performance below aspiration levels has been related to larger magnitude of strategic changes 
(Miller & Chen 1994; Zajac & Kraatz, 1993; Audia, Locke, and Smith, 2000).  
Taken together, these findings suggest that low-performing firms with high slack display high 
tolerance to risk. Risky alternatives become more acceptable because the decision-maker is now 
in the loss domain (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). This suggests that poor-performing 
multimarket firms with abundant slack will escalate the competition to higher levels. Hence, they 
may take longer to forbear, because they will not be as much concerned with maintaining the 
competitive equilibrium as they are with recovering from the shortfall. However, as rivals start 
 49 
retaliating to this excessively aggressive behavior, the aggressive firms will tend to forbear from 
further market entry, and again abide by the mutual interdependencies that their multimarket ties 
represent. In sum, the interaction between performance below aspiration level and high slack 
moderates the relationship between multimarket contact and market entry as it exacerbates the 
expansionist motivation and pushes the threshold away from the point where it would be under 
normal conditions. This relationship is depicted in Figure 3.3(a) and stated in H1a: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1a): The impact of a firm’s level of multimarket contact with its 
rivals on the firm’s rate of market entry will be amplified when the firm’s 
performance is below the aspiration level and its level of slack resources is high. 
 
3.2.3 Firm performance below aspiration level and low slack  
Contrary to resource-rich firms, resource-poor firms performing below aspiration level will be 
risk-averse (Audia and Greve, 2006). A threat to survival results in restriction of information and 
rigidity in strategic action (Staw et al., 1981). This suggests that low-performing, resource-poor 
firms will pursue market entry very cautiously. First, those firms do not have slack resources to 
enter into markets in order to create deterrence. Second, under conditions of adversity, low-slack 
firms shift their focus of attention to the firm‟s internal activities (Hambrick and D‟Aveni, 1988). 
Consequently, they start forbearing sooner than they would under normal conditions. In sum, the 
interaction between performance below aspiration level and limited slack moderates the 
relationship between multimarket contact and market entry as it diminishes the expansionist 
motivation and moves the threshold to the left from the point where it should be under normal 
conditions. This relationship is depicted in Figure 3.3(b) and stated in H2a: 
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(b) Performance below aspiration 
level, low slack
(a) Performance below aspiration 
level, high slack
Figure 3.3 – Market Entry and the Moderating Effects of Firm Performance and Organizational Slack
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Hypothesis 2a (H2a): The impact of a firm’s level of multimarket contact with its 
rivals on the firm’s rate of market entry will be attenuated when firm performance is 
below the aspiration level and its level of slack resources is limited. 
 
3.2.4 Firm performance above aspiration level 
Change is less likely to occur when the organization performs above the aspiration level 
(Cyert and March, 1963). Studies have found that good past performance induces firms to carry 
competitive repertoires characterized as having high levels of inertia (Miller and Chen, 1994) 
and that financially successful firms are less likely to respond to competitive challenges 
(Hambrick, Cho, and Chen, 1996).  Taken together, these findings suggest that high performing 
firms seek stability in competitive practices. Although the rational view of mutual forbearance 
suggests that firms coordinate their actions in order to maximize profits, from a behavioral 
perspective, firms avoid uncertainty in order to obtain profits that satisfies the dominant coalition 
(Cyert and March, 1963). The goal is to seek ways to make an uncertain environment 
predictable. For example, firms enter markets of known competitors because they allow 
managers to draw on their past experience regarding the competitive responses of better-known 
rivals (Stephen et al., 2003).  
High performing firms also tend to display recurring competitive patterns since success 
reinforces past strategic decisions (Levitt and March, 1988). Hence, they are also less willing to 
abandon the multimarket strategy that generated the performance in the first place (Greve, 1998). 
Risk avoidance in this context means that high-performing firms have fewer incentives to disrupt 
the tacit agreements that the multimarket structures represent. Indeed, multimarket contact 
always facilitates collusion when firms‟ objectives are concave, that is to say when firms are risk 
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averse (Spagnolo, 1999). Thus, because performance goals are satisfied, firms can attend to 
competitive goals and abide by the focus on performance above aspiration level does not trigger 
problemistic search (Cyert and March, 1963), and consequently, does not moderate the 
relationship between multimarket contact and market entry rates. This relationship is depicted in 
Figure 3.3(c) and stated in H3a: 
Hypothesis 3a (H3a): Performance above aspiration does not moderate the 
inverted-U-shaped relationship between a firm’s level of multimarket contact with 
its rivals and a firm’s rate of market entry. 
  
3.3 Market Exit 
One of the most understudied behaviors in competitive dynamics is exit. Generally 
speaking, if the assumptions of multimarket competition are valid, then they will be exhibited in 
exit decisions similarly to entry decisions. Furthermore, the impact of performance relative to 
aspiration level should also be seen in exit patterns.  
In this section, I develop hypotheses regarding the moderating effect of firm performance 
and organizational slack on market exit behavior. I first present the mutual forbearance null 
hypothesis with respect to exit in order to make the theoretical model complete, and then develop 
three hypotheses. Each hypothesis addresses one of the possible performance/organizational 
slack categories: performance below aspiration level and high slack, performance below 
aspiration level and low slack, and performance above aspiration level.  
 
3.3.1 The mutual forbearance null hypothesis for market exit 
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The relationship between multimarket contact and market exit behavior is shown in Figure 
3.4, representing the empirical evidence that firms are sensitive to their level of multimarket 
contact with competitors when making market exit decisions (Baum and Korn 1996, Boeker et 
al. 1997).  
Figure 3.4 – The mutual forbearance null hypothesis for market exit 
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At low levels of multimarket contact with its competitors in a focal market, a focal firm does 
not have an extended interdependence with them. Thus, when contemplating market exit, firms 
opt to exit markets that do not provide a credible deterrent to rivals, because presence in such 
markets does not enable firms to signal their ability to respond to future aggressions (Edwards 
1955). However, as multimarket contact reaches higher levels, the motivation to exit from 
markets is likely to decline. First, firms with a high level of multimarket contact with rivals have 
the ability to signal deterrence. For instance, Gimeno (1999) found that airlines use a relatively 
small presence in their rivals‟ hubs to reduce the competitive intensity of these rivals in their own 
hub. As a result, maintaining footholds in markets with high multimarket contact leads to stable 
market shares (Heggestad and Rhoades 1978) and reduced levels of competition in individual 
markets (Scott 1982). Accordingly, all studies examining the relationship between multimarket 
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contact and market exit decisions (Barnett 1993; Baum and Korn 1996, 1999; Boeker et al. 1997) 
found that higher levels of multimarket contact are associated with lower exit rates.  
 Another aspect that contributes to lower exit rates is the fact that the prolonged presence in 
markets with high multimarket contact may considerably raise exit barriers (Porter 1980). 
Indeed, businesses which are of high strategic importance are difficult to be divested due to the 
value created by non-capital investments (Harrigan 1980). Moreover, even if these markets do 
not yield profitable margins, firms are unlikely to abandon them because of the cross-
subsidization from profitable markets (Cho and Cohen 1997). The rationale behind a firm‟s 
keeping footholds in markets with high multimarket contact is that the costs incurred in such 
activity are justifiable, because decreased levels of rivalry lead to performance levels that would 
be lower otherwise (Hughes & Oughton 1993; Evans & Kessides 1994; Jans & Rosenbaum 
1996; Gimeno and Woo 1999). Thus, the arguments above can be summarized as the mutual 
forbearance null hypothesis for market exit: 
Hypothesis 0b (H0b): There is a negative relationship between a firm’s level of 
multimarket contact with market incumbents and a firm’s rate of market exit, such 
that firms with higher levels of multimarket contact with incumbents in a focal 
market are less likely to exit that market than firms with lower levels of 
multimarket contact. 
 
 In the next paragraphs, I develop hypotheses addressing the moderating effect of firm 
performance and slack on the relationship between multimarket contact and market exit. An 
illustration of the hypothesized effects is shown in Figure 3.5. 
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(b) Performance below aspiration 
level, low slack
(a) Performance below aspiration 
level, high slack
Figure 3.5 – Market Exit and the Moderating Effects of Firm Performance and Organizational Slack
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3.3.2 Firm performance below aspiration level and high slack 
According to the March-Shapira model (1992), the effects of performance below aspiration 
level on risk taking differ depending on the level of organizational slack, in that high-resource 
firms are risk-seekers, and low-resource firms are risk averse (Audia and Greve 2006). In the 
context of market exit decisions, the decision to remain in a market is riskier than the decision to 
exit from it (Shimizu 2007). Hence, high-resource firms performing below aspiration level have 
incentives to remain rather than withdraw from markets. Not surprisingly, high-resource firms 
divest not as often as low-resource firms when faced with the same performance gap (Chang 
1996). Accordingly, research has found that high-resource firms are more likely to cut capacity 
incrementally (Lieberman 1990), and also likely to hold physical assets idle but ready to resume, 
a situation that affords recuperative flexibility that discourages competitor entry or expansion 
(Harrigan 1985). These findings have implications for the expected market exit behavior under 
the mutual forbearance null hypothesis.  
According to the mutual forbearance null hypothesis, firms with low levels of multimarket 
contact firms are more likely to exit from markets than firms with high levels of multimarket 
contact (Baum and Korn 1996; Boeker et al. 1997). However, an increased propensity to take 
risk is translated into a greater need to show deterrence capability, meaning that high-resource, 
low-performing firms are less likely to exit from markets. Thus, the negative relationship 
between multimarket contact and market exit rates is moderated by below-aspiration firm 
performance and large slack. This relationship is depicted in Figure 3.5(a) and stated in 
Hypothesis 1b (H1b):  
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The impact of a firm’s level of multimarket contact with market incumbents on the 
firm’s rate of market exit will be attenuated when firm performance is below the 
aspiration level and its level of slack is high  
 
3.3.3 Firm performance below aspiration level and low slack 
Contrary to high-resource firms, low-resource firms performing below aspiration level are 
risk averse (March-Shapira 1992). Excessive pools of financial and managerial resources may 
insulate high-resource firms from pressures to exit from current markets, but low-resource firms 
are unable to buffer these pressures (Shimizu and Hitt 2005). Hence, as firm performance 
decreases, the likelihood of exit increases (Duhaime and Grant 1984; Montgomery and Thomas 
1988; Ravenscraft and Scherer 1991; Chang 1996; Steiner 1997).  
Low-resource firms liquidate and divest more subunits to generate cash (D‟Aveni 1989), 
since they interpret decreases in performance as a threat to survival rather than a repairable gap 
(Audia and Greve 2006). Fombrun and Ginsberg (1990) suggest another incentive for low-
resource firms to exit from markets. They noted that, although entry into other markets may not 
be an available option for many poor performing firms, the exit option does not require such 
capital investment. Hence, poorly performing firms may try to correct the problems by divesting 
underperforming businesses without necessarily moving into new ones (Chang 1996).  
Taken together, these ideas suggest that low-performing firms with limited resources pursue 
market exit more vigorously than low-performing firms with abundant slack do. Furthermore, 
since the exit process involves stages and complexities that create great potential for experience 
and learning curve benefits (Lieberman 1987, 1989), low-resource firms gain experience with 
sell-offs and divestitures. Consequently, they will continue to use them (Bergh and Lim 2008).  
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Yet they maintain footholds in some markets. When faced with increasing uncertainty, 
corporate-level managers are pressured to direct their resources toward the individual business 
lines they understand best (Jones & Hill, 1988). Hence, peripheral markets would receive less 
attention and preference than core markets (Bergh 1998). By extension, as low-slack firms are 
risk averse, they prefer to remain in core markets such as markets with high levels of 
multimarket contact, since the potential for deterrence is higher in such markets (Baum and Korn 
1996). These arguments suggest that the negative relationship between multimarket contact and 
market exit rates is moderated by below-aspiration firm performance and low slack. This 
relationship is depicted in Figure 3.5(b) and set out as Hypothesis 2b: 
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): The impact of a firm’s level of multimarket contact with market 
incumbents on the firm’s rate of market exit will be amplified when the firm’s 
performance is below the aspiration level and its level of slack resources is limited 
 
3.3.4 Firm performance above aspiration level 
As predicted by the behavioral theory of the firm, risk taking is less likely when firms 
perform above aspiration level (Cyert & March 1963). High performing firms also tend to 
display recurring competitive patterns because success reinforces past strategic decisions (March 
and Levitt 1988) and induces firms to carry competitive repertoires characterized as having high 
levels of inertia (Miller and Chen 1994). Being risk averse, high-performing firms are more 
likely to maintain footholds in „safe‟ markets: markets with high levels of multimarket contact, 
due to high-performing firms‟ ability to signal deterrence to rivals. This rationale is similar to the 
mutual forbearance null hypothesis which predicts that firms are less likely to remain in markets 
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with low levels of multimarket contact, but more likely to remain in markets with high levels 
(Barnett 1993; Baum and Korn 1996, Boeker et al. 1997). 
Risk avoidance also means that high-performing firms have fewer incentives to disrupt the 
tacit agreements that the multimarket structures represent. Accordingly, Spagnolo (1999) found 
that multimarket contact always facilitates collusion when firms‟ objectives are concave, that is 
to say when firms are risk averse. Hence, high performing firms are likely to display a 
competitive behavior that resembles the one predicted by the mutual forbearance null hypothesis. 
Thus, performance above aspiration level regardless of the level of slack does not appear to 
affect the relationship between multimarket contact and market exit. This relationship is depicted 
in Figure 3.5(c) and set out as Hypothesis 3b: 
Hypothesis 3b (H3b): Performance above aspiration does not moderate the 
negative relationship between a firm’s level of multimarket contact with market 
incumbents and a firm’s rate of market exit. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 In my dissertation I integrate the behavioral theory of the firm into the multimarket theory, 
proposing a behavioral model of multimarket competition that focuses on market entry and exit 
behaviors. Table 3.1 provides a summary of the hypotheses. I argue that the relationship between 
multimarket contact and market entry and exit behavior is influenced by performance relative to 
aspiration level and the level of slack resources, and then make predictions for each of the 
performance/slack categories as follows.  
For performance below aspiration level and high slack, I hypothesize that their interaction 
amplifies the effect of multimarket contact on market entry rates, but attenuates the effect of 
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multimarket contact on market exit. For performance below aspiration level and low slack, I 
hypothesize that their interaction attenuates the effect of multimarket contact on market entry, 
but amplifies the effect on market exit. Finally, I hypothesize that performance above aspiration 
level does not moderate either the relationship between multimarket contact and market entry, or 
the relationship between multimarket contact and market exit. 
 
Table 3.1 – Summary of hypotheses 
 
Moderators Market Entry Market Exit 
Null hypothesis (baseline 
model) 
H0a: There will be an inverted-U-
shaped relationship between a firm‟s 
level of multimarket contact with its 
rivals and a firm‟s rate of market entry 
H0b: There is a negative relationship 
between a firm‟s level of multimarket 
contact with market incumbents and a 
firm‟s rate of market exit 
 
Performance below 
aspiration level and high 
slack 
H1a: The impact of a firm‟s level of 
multimarket contact with its rivals on 
the firm‟s rate of market entry will be 
amplified when the firm‟s performance 
is below the aspiration level and its 
level of slack resources is high 
H1b: The impact of a firm‟s level of 
multimarket contact with market 
incumbents on the firm‟s rate of market 
exit will be attenuated when firm 
performance is below the aspiration 
level and its level of slack resources is 
high 
 
Performance below 
aspiration level and low 
slack 
H2a: The impact of a firm‟s level of 
multimarket contact with its rivals on 
the firm‟s rate of market entry will be 
attenuated when firm performance is 
below the aspiration level and its level 
of slack resources is limited 
H2b: The impact of a firm‟s level of 
multimarket contact with market 
incumbents on the firm‟s rate of market 
exit will be amplified when the firm‟s 
performance is below the aspiration 
level and its level of slack resources is 
limited 
 
Performance above 
aspiration level, 
irrespective of the level of 
slack resources 
H3a: Performance above aspiration 
does not moderate the inverted-U-
shaped relationship between a firm‟s 
level of multimarket contact with its 
rivals and a firm‟s rate of market entry 
H3b: Performance above aspiration does 
not moderate the negative relationship 
between a firm‟s level of multimarket 
contact with market incumbents and a 
firm‟s rate of market exit 
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CHAPTER 4 – RESEARCH CONTEXT 
 
The previous chapter proposes a theoretical model of behavioral boundary conditions for the 
mutual forbearance hypothesis regarding market entry and exit. In this chapter I describe the 
contextual setting in which the theoretical model will be tested. First, I present the research 
requirements and challenges for testing the theoretical model. Next, I explain why the U.S. 
property and liability insurance industry is an appropriate empirical setting, and concluding the 
chapter, I provide a brief description of the industry. 
 
4.1 Selecting a contextual setting for empirical analysis 
4.1.1 Research requirements 
To ensure that the empirical results of the study have statistical validity, I must select an 
empirical setting in which the conditions for multimarket competition are more likely to be 
satisfied.  First, the empirical setting must be characterized by multimarket firms, that is to say, 
firms operating in several market segments. Another condition is extended interdependence 
between competitors, which occurs as firms encounter the same competitors across multiple 
markets. This condition is crucial as it facilitates forbearance behavior, when firms tacitly 
coordinate their competitive actions in order to achieve decreased rivalry and, consequently, 
enhanced performance. Moreover, the testing of the model also requires longitudinal data 
because the recognition of extended interdependence arises as a result of repeated interaction 
over time.  
One of the assumptions of the theoretical model is that intensity of rivalry is not a quality of 
industry structure but varies from market to market according to the set of competitors operating 
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in each specific market. Because the source of competition for a firm within a market must be the 
set of competitors in that market, the empirical setting must be characterized by no cross-
elasticity across markets (i.e. products or services offered to different markets are not close 
substitutes), and by homogenous products or services (i.e. firms competing with little 
differentiation). Moreover, clearly delimited market boundaries facilitate the identification of 
incumbents and potential entrants to a given market. Since the dissertation focus is on a specific 
competitive behavior – market entry and exit decisions – it is equally important that the 
empirical setting be characterized by market entry and exit activity.  The empirical setting must 
have intrafirm coordination mechanisms that enable firms to recognize the level of multimarket 
contact with their rivals and act accordingly (Golden and Ma 2003; Jayachandran et al 1999).  
According to Gimeno and Woo (1999), multimarket competition theory may be most 
relevant under conditions of resource sharing among market units and under conditions of related 
diversification or geographic expansion. Hence, empirical analysis of product or geographic 
diversification within a single industry seems warranted. Indeed, Stephan et al. (2003) caution 
that inflection points, i.e. the point at which the relationship between multimarket contact levels 
and the rate of competitive entry switches from a positive one to a negative one, are likely to be 
unique to each industry. 
Heterogeneity in the dependent and independent variables is also a necessary condition. 
Because the model predicts relationships between continuous variables, the empirical context 
must provide enough variance in multimarket contact (e.g. from low to high levels), competitive 
behavior (e.g. from mild to intense entry and exit activity), as well as variance in firm 
performance and slack. 
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In sum, the empirical context for testing the theoretical model must satisfy the following 
conditions: multimarket firms, interdependence between competitors, internal coordination 
mechanisms, longitudinal data, no cross-elasticity across markets, homogenous products, clearly 
delimited market boundaries, market entry and exit activity, single industry, and heterogeneity in 
the dependent and independent variables. 
 
4.1.2 The U.S. property and liability insurance industry 
The U.S. property and liability insurance industry offers an appropriate research context for 
empirical analysis of this dissertation‟s theoretical model, since it satisfies all conditions above 
mentioned. First, the property-liability insurance industry is characterized by multimarket firms, 
selling several insurance products and operating across a few or several states. Extended 
interdependence becomes characteristic of this industry because insurers are likely to encounter 
the same competitors in several product and geographic markets in which they operate. 
Consequently, their fortunes are interrelated.  
The condition that market boundaries must be clearly delimited is attained as market 
segments can be either geographic (the 50 states and D.C.) or product markets (lines of 
businesses such as personal auto and homeowners insurance). In prior empirical studies on 
multimarket competition, researchers have investigated mutual forbearance in one-dimensional 
markets – either geographic (e.g. airlines city-pair routes) or product markets (e.g. hospital 
services). The U.S. insurance industry offers the opportunity to examine multimarket 
competition across two-dimensional markets, i.e. geo-product markets (D‟Aveni 2001). 
Despite being regulated, the property-liability insurance industry possesses the structural 
characteristics normally associated with the idealized competitive market: a large number of 
  64 
firms, operating in markets with low concentration levels, and selling essentially identical 
products in some lines of business (Joskow 1973). Moreover, entry and exit barriers appear to be 
low as the capital requirements of a company seeking to become incorporated or enter a state 
where it has not been licensed previously are not very high. For example, state fixed minimum 
capital requirements average in the area of $2 million, which most insurers easily meet (Best‟s 
Review 2007). Thus, market entry and exit activity is found in this industry. Moreover, because 
these decisions define a firm‟s scope, they are centralized at the corporate level. Thus, the 
condition of internal coordination is satisfied. 
The single industry condition is also satisfied as the insurance industry provides opportunity 
for related product and geographic diversification to be examined.  Expectations for economies 
of scope in the insurance industry are largely attributable to the ability to cross-sell products, 
generate cost savings, create hybrid products, enhance brand image, and develop new sales 
channels. 
In the property-liability insurance industry, there is no cross-elasticity across markets, since 
products serve particular needs and are not close substitutes. For instance, homeowners insurance 
is not a substitute for personal auto insurance. Moreover, product homogeneity is also present in 
this industry. The product itself – the policy – is essentially identical from company to company 
within a market since most policy forms are mandated by state law. Indeed, many customers 
view insurance products as commodities for which price matters more than service (A. M. Best, 
2007). 
Heterogeneity in the dependent and independent variables is another condition satisfied with 
this industry as the property-liability segment provides a diverse context for research, with firms 
of all sizes and performance levels. Also, because of the multitude of product and geographic 
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markets, the industry is characterized by firms with different levels of contact and entailing 
different market entry and exit patterns. Finally, since every insurer operating in the U.S. needs 
to comply with filing regulations, the quality of data is very high and longitudinal data at the 
most disaggregated level are available.  
 Although the theoretical model of this dissertation does not establish whether it assumes full 
or imperfect observability (Matsushima 2001), this study provides a strong test of mutual 
forbearance under conditions of imperfect observability, since information about prices and 
quality is not readily available (Greve 2008b). 
 
4.2 The U.S property and liability insurance industry 
4.2.1 Industry overview 
The insurance mechanism focuses primarily on uncertainty regarding the chance that a 
particular loss will occur (Joskow 1973). From a business perspective, the costs associated with 
uncertainty can discourage business growth, whereas from a customer perspective, uncertainty 
over the financial consequences of loss to homes or autos can affect spending levels. Thus, by 
transferring the potential financial consequences of their loss exposures to an insurer, businesses 
and individuals can minimize the effects of uncertainty. Not surprisingly, the products sold by 
the insurance industry are purchased by virtually all economic agents in the U.S. economy.  
The insurance industry constitutes a large part of the financial services sector in the U.S., 
providing nearly some 2.3 million jobs, or 2.1 percent of U.S. employment. Insurers also 
contribute more than $250 billion to the nation‟s gross domestic product (Insurance Information 
Institute 2006).  
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The insurance industry in the U.S. is divided into two broad categories, life insurance and 
property-liability insurance. Property-liability insurance, which is the focus of this dissertation, 
covers direct losses from damage to property, indirect losses resulting from direct losses (e.g., 
loss of income from damages to a business facility), and loss of possession. Coverage is provided 
to both personal and commercial customers; the former include individuals, and the latter, 
business policyholders.  
The property and liability insurance industry has grown significantly over the last 30 years. 
Table 4.1 provides historical trends of the property-liability insurance industry. Between 1970 
and 2005, the assets of property-liability insurers increased from $55 billion to $1.4 trillion. At 
the same time, total premium increased from $36 billion to $475 billion. In terms of profitability, 
insurers have experienced „good‟ years (e.g. 13.1 percent in 1980) and „bad‟ years (i.e. 6.8 
percent in 2000). 
 
Table 4.1 – Property and Liability Insurance Trends 
 
  1970 1980 1990 2000 2005 
Assets ($M) 55 198 556 1,034 1,398 
Premiums Written ($M) 36,524 108,745 252,991 341,590 475,200 
Return (%) 11.6 13.1 8.5 6.8 10.4 
Number of firms 2,800 2,953 3,899 3,215 2,700 
 
Source: A.M. Best and Insurance Information Institute 
 
The number of firms in the industry consistently increased between 1970 and 1990. 
However, it began to drop in the 1990s, as the industry experienced a wave of mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As). The M&A wave was driven in part by advances in technology (Graham, 
Loftin, Xie, and Xiaoying, 2007), but the wave also coincides with a period of relative prosperity 
in the industry, which experienced high capitalization and low leverage during most of the period 
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(Cummins and Xie 2008). The industry is still characterized by a significant number of small 
insurers selling insurance products in limited geographic areas, but the top 200 insurers in the 
industry write 95% of the premiums in the property-liability insurance (Best‟s Review 2007). 
Although the insurance business is associated with increased financial risk – both 
impairment and insolvency (the insurance‟s world equivalent of bankruptcy) have been relatively 
rare. Figure 4.1 shows the frequency of insurer impairment over the 1976-2005 period. Average 
annual rates of impairment were about one in 120 companies. The dominant causes of 
impairment have remained constant for over 30 years: deficient loss reserves, inadequate pricing, 
and rapid growth (A.M. Best Special Report 2006).  
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Figure 4.1 – U.S. Property-Liability Insurers, Annual Impairment Rate, 1976-2005 
Source: A.M. Best, 2007, The guide to understanding the insurance industry. 
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4.2.2 Property liability insurance products 
The property-liability insurance industry encompasses several lines of business: 
homeowners, personal auto, commercial auto, fire and allied, commercial multiple peril, 
farmowners multiple peril, ocean marine, inland marine, financial and mortgage guaranty, surety 
and fidelity, medical malpractice, workers‟ compensation, group accident and health, general 
liability, theft, boiler and machinery, and other miscellaneous property/casualty.  
Table 4.2 shows the structure of the property-liability insurance in 2007. Premiums written 
(PW) represent the revenues for insurance companies. Although consisting of several business 
lines, the property-liability insurance industry has an uneven distribution of revenues across 
markets.  
Table 4.2 – Premiums Written by Business Line in 2007 
Business Line  
PW 
($M) 
% Total 
PW 
Loss 
Ratio 
% 
M.S. 
Top 2 
Writers 
% 
M.S. 
Top 10 
Writers 
Leading 
Writer 
% 
M.S. 
% 
Writer's 
Total 
PW 
2nd 
Leading 
Writer 
% 
M.S. 
% 
Writer's 
Total 
PW 
Personal Auto 162 33.2% 64 28.9% 60% State Farm 17.5% 34.6% Allstate 11.3% 37.0% 
Homeowners 63 13.0% 51 33.0% 64% State Farm 21.7% 28.8% Allstate 11.3% 11.3% 
Other Liability 52 10.7% 52 26.0%  AIG 19.2% 31.5% Zurich 6.8% 27.3% 
Worker‟s Compensation 50 10.2% 62 23.6% 53% AIG 12.4% 19.5% 
Liberty 
Mutual 
11.2% 28.0% 
Commercial Multiple 
Peril 
35 7.2% 41 15.0% 48% Travelers 9.1% 14.6% Hartford 5.9% 18.2% 
Commercial Auto 29 5.9% 54 14.0%  Travelers 7.7% 7.6% Progressive 6.5% 13.5% 
Inland Marine 14 3.0% 36 17.5%  CNA  9.0% 14.9% AIG 8.5% 3.9% 
Fire 11 2.3% 32 25.3%  AIG 16.7% 5.9% 
Assurant 
Solutions 
8.6% 30.8% 
Allied 11 2.2% 36 27.5%  Citizens  18.5% 53.4% AIG 9.0% 3.0% 
Medical Malpractice 10 2.1% 39 14.3% 42% 
Berkshire 
Hathaway 
7.4% 5.0% AIG 6.9% 2.2% 
Multiple Peril Crop 7 1.4% 57 33.8%  Ace INA 17.1% 14.9% Centurion 16.7% 99.7% 
Mortgage Guaranty 6 1.2% 95 41.6%  
Mortgage 
Guar  
24.6% 100.0% Radian 17.0% 84.2% 
Surety 5 1.1% 18 27.3%  Travelers 18.9% 4.6% Zurich 8.4% 3.4% 
Product Liability 4 0.8% 37 20.7%  AIG 12.3% 1.5% Zurich 8.4% 2.5% 
Group Accident and 
Health 
3 0.7% 57 36.6%  AIG 27.1% 3.0% 
Federated 
Mutual 
9.5% 28.0% 
Ocean Marine 3 0.6% 46 22.9%  AIG 13.2% 1.3% Travelers 9.7% 1.4% 
Financial Guaranty 3 0.6% 135 50.9%  Ambac Fin 28.3% 99.1% MBIA 22.6% 100.0% 
Farmowners Multiple 
Peril 
3 0.5% 59 15.2%  Nationwide 8.5% 1.4% State Farm 6.7% 0.4% 
Federal Flood 3 0.5% 12 31.7%  
Fidelity 
National 
17.5% 72.8% State Farm 14.2% 0.8% 
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Earthquake 2 0.5% -2 30.3%  
CA 
Earthquake 
20.7% 100.0% State Farm 9.6% 0.5% 
Aircraft 2 0.5% 46 41.6%  AIG 28.9% 2.1% 
Berkshire 
Hathaway 
12.7% 1.9% 
Other Accident and 
Health 
2 0.4% 79 63.8%  State Farm 40.8% 1.6% CNA  23.0% 5.0% 
Credit 2 0.3% 95 32.8%  AIG 18.6% 1.0% 
Old 
Republic 
14.2% 7.3% 
Fidelity 1 0.2% 36 36.6%  Chubb 20.6% 2.5% Travelers 16.0% 0.9% 
Boiler and Machinery 1 0.2% 31 42.8%  FM Global 25.5% 11.1% AIG 17.3% 0.6% 
Burglary and Theft 0.2 0.0% 16 40.4%  Travelers 20.9% 0.2% Chubb 19.5% 0.3% 
Miscellaneous 3 0.6% 101         
TOTAL 488 100.0%          
Source: Best‟s Review (August, 2008) 
 
Half of the premiums written in the industry are spread over more than twenty markets, 
whereas two lines – personal auto and homeowners – concentrate almost half of the total 
premiums written. In these markets, two firms have a large share – State Farm and Allstate, 
being responsible for almost a third of the total premiums written in each market. These firms‟ 
stakes in these markets are also high – approximately two thirds of State Farm‟s premiums and 
half of Allstate‟s premiums are written in these markets. Interestingly, some firms pursue a 
nearly dominant business strategy in some markets (e.g. financial and mortgage guaranty, 
earthquake, and multiple peril crop), whereas others have a diversified business scope.  
 
4.2.3 Insurance operations 
4.2.3.1 Organizational forms 
Any firm within the insurance industry has three important functions: the manager function 
– the decision makers who establish the corporate strategy; the owner function – those who 
provide capital and bear risks; and the customer function – the policyholders who pay the 
premiums. The organizational forms within the insurance industry – stock, mutual and Lloyds – 
differ in the manner in which they combine these three functions. 
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In stock companies, the distinguishing characteristic is the potentially complete separation of 
the manager, owner, and customer functions. These companies are the most prevalent type of 
proprietary insurer in the U.S. In mutual companies, the policyholders are both customers and 
owners. This type of insurer is formed to provide insurance at a minimum cost to policyholders, 
who own the insurer. Generally, it is assumed that the stock and mutual companies have different 
goals, as the former seeks to maximize profits, whereas the latter seeks to minimize 
administrative costs and insurance losses, because mutual firms are formed to provide insurance 
at a minimum cost to policyholders. 
Lloyds are another kind of organizational form. They are not an insurance company, but a 
marketplace such as a stock exchange. In Lloyds, syndicates of members typically underwrite 
policies, and members delegate the day-to-day management to the syndicate manager. Thus, the 
manager and the owner functions are merged. Yet a very prominent organizational form overseas 
(e.g. the Lloyds of London provide complex coverage for marine insurance), American Lloyds 
account for a very small amount of U.S. premiums, most localized in the state of Texas. 
 
4.2.3.2. Organizational actors 
As in agency theory, an agent represents the insurer (“the principal”) in the performance of 
some function. Legally, an agent can be either an employee of the principal or an independent 
contractor. The term broker is reserved for independent contractors who represent policyholders 
in dealing with insurers. In effect, a broker acts as an agent of the policyholder. Another actor in 
insurance marketing is a producer, defined as a person who sells insurance to customers. 
Producers can be employees of insurers, agents, or brokers.  
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4.2.3.3. Value chain 
 The insurance business is complex and a considerable amount of expertise is required to 
successfully operate an insurer. Insurers perform three core functions to meet their goals: 
marketing, underwriting, and claims. Other functions are: Loss control, Reinsurance, Actuarial, 
Investments, Information Technology, Human Resources, Accounting, and Legal Services. 
 
Marketing and distribution systems. Marketing involves determining what products or 
services customers want and need and delivering them to those customers. Once the marketing 
plan has been developed, insurers market their products and services through distribution 
systems. Property-liability insurance can be distributed through an independent agency system, 
exclusive agency system, and direct writer system. The independent agency and brokerage 
system use producers who are independent contractors and are free to represent as many or as 
few insurers as they want. The exclusive agency also uses producers who are independent 
contractors, but they are restricted by contract to representing a single insurer. The direct writer 
system uses producers who are employees of the insurers they represent.  
No one distribution channel meets the needs of all insurers and all insurance customers. The 
independent agency and brokerage system is likely to attract buyers who have complex insurance 
needs or consider quality of service more important than cost. For example, it is used to market 
lines of commercial insurance since these lines require more direct involvement from the 
producer. On the other hand, the exclusive agency and direct writer system are used more 
frequently for personal insurance. Since the insurance industry is very competitive, insurers find 
it advantageous to use multiple distribution channels, including internet.  
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Underwriting. The underwriting department‟s responsibility is to determine whether the 
applications received meet the guidelines established by the insurer. The department‟s goal is to 
write a profitable book of business for the insurer. Underwriters work with the marketing 
department to accept those accounts most likely to produce a profit for the insurer. However, 
underwriting liability presents many challenges for underwriters. Legislation and court decisions 
require frequent changes to policy forms and underwriting guidelines. Such an environment 
requires underwriters to keep up to date with emerging issues.  
 
Claims. The first goal of the claim function is to satisfy the insurer‟s obligations to the 
policyholder as set forth in the insurance policy. Following a loss, the promise of the insuring 
agreement to pay, defend, or indemnify in the event of a covered loss is fulfilled (A. M. Best, 
2007). The second goal is supporting the insurer‟s profit goal, which means that the claims 
function help insurers achieve an underwriting profit through controlling expenses. The claim 
function also provides valuable information to other departments such as marketing, 
underwriting, and actuarial.  
 
4.2.4. Regulation 
The insurance industry is regulated at the state and federal levels. State insurance 
departments implement specific directives from the legislature, extending from incorporation to 
liquidation and encompassing several activities in between. Two important functions of state 
insurance regulators are solvency and market regulation. Rejda (1998) notes that there are two 
primary reasons for regulators‟ concern with insurer solvency. First, due to the nature of the 
insuring agreement, premiums are paid prior to the payment of any loses that may arise. Hence, 
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regulation reduces the possibility that future losses will not be paid. Second, through solvency, 
the economic hardship policy holders would suffer as a result of failure of an insurer can be 
reduced. Regulators limit insolvency risk by requiring insurers to maintain a minimum amount of 
capital and surplus and meet other financial requirements.  
It is important to distinguish between limiting insolvencies and preventing insolvency, as 
well as to understand their potential consequences. Limiting insolvency risk implies that some 
insurers may become insolvent as failure is likely to occur in any competitive market (Joskow 
1973). On the other hand, preventing any insolvency from occurring would make the regulation 
very stringent, thus leading firms to constrain their investments to reduce the likelihood of 
failure. The result would be high insurance prices and inefficient markets, a situation that 
regulation attempts to prevent in the first place (Redja, 1998). 
Market regulation is another function of state insurance regulators. The fundamental 
objective is to promote the proper functioning of insurance markets to serve the interest of 
consumers and society (Joskow 1973). For the personal property-liability lines, half of the U.S. 
states require rates to be filed and receive prior approval before they go into effect, whereas other 
states rely on competition to regulate prices (Klein, 1995).  
A recurring issue in market regulation is whether insurance markets are competitive. 
Research on the effects of rate regulation has generally found that prior approval systems do not 
have a strong effect on premium levels or profitability (Klein, 1995). In other words, markets 
with prior approval systems and competitive rating tend to perform similarly on average.  
Throughout its history, the insurance industry in the U.S. has seen several regulatory acts 
that either tighten or relax the norms. The latest act regulating financial services industry, 
including insurers, was the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLB Act). Also know as the 
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Financial Services Modernization Act, the GLB Act revolutionized the way that providers of 
goods and services within the financial services industry do business. A bank, an insurer, and a 
securities firm are now allowed to affiliate under common ownership and offer customers a wide 
array of financial services products. This act resulted in the entry of banking institutions into the 
insurance industry as sellers and distributors of insurance products. On the other hand, more than 
eight years later, few insurance carriers have realized their goals in selling banking products 
through their vast agency networks (Best‟s Review September 2008). 
The debate over state versus federal regulation has also been a persistent issue in the 
insurance industry. Those who support regulation at the state level argue that this state regulation 
is more responsive to local needs and that federal regulation would dilute states‟ rights. On the 
other hand, proponents of federal regulation argue that the centralization would make regulation 
more efficient and uniform. According to the 2009 state regulatory budgets to the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners, regulatory spending varies significantly nationwide, 
ranging from a high of $30 per resident in Delaware to a low of $2 per resident in 11 other states. 
Overall, the 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia are projected to spend more than $1.54 
billion in 2009 on the regulation of insurance. Congress is now weighing proposals to create a 
federal regulatory option for insurance, particularly since insurance regulation has proven to be a 
profit center for most states. For example, states collected $2.58 billion in fees and penalties 
imposed on companies last year, providing a “regulatory surplus” of nearly $1.2 billion. 
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CHAPTER 5 – DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
  
5.1 Data source and operationalization 
The data for the property liability insurance industry comes from the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) annual statements. They include information concerning both 
private and public firms operating in the property and liability insurance segment in the U.S., 
including statutory filing data on income statements, balance sheets, and other insurance-related 
aspects of the business. The data contain the breakdown of premiums written and losses incurred 
from 22 property-liability product lines in the U.S. 50 states and the District of Columbia. All 
insurance companies operating in the U.S. are required to file this statement annually. Thus, the 
database contains annual information on the entire population of firms in the U.S. property-
liability insurance industry. 
The annual statement for each firm is made up of 95 reports. These reports are recorded as 
large text files, and I subsequently, imported them into SAS data sets. Before running any 
statistical analysis, I needed to extract the information from these data sets and create a database 
that contains data on every dependent, independent, and control variables of the study. SAS 
software provides two programming languages for data set manipulation: DATA step and 
Structured Query Language (SQL). DATA step is a group of SAS programming statements used 
for reading, combining, and modifying data sets. SQL is a standardized, widely used language 
that uses relational algebra for data retrieval and updating. In SQL, the data sets are considered 
collection of objects or tables and SQL provides a natural language to establish relationships 
among the tables. 
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Although more complex and requiring more training than SAS DATA step, SQL has more 
functionalities that provide flexibility in terms of programming and data management. For 
example, while SAS DATA step manipulates the data sets sequentially, with SQL it is possible 
to create indexes that provide quicker access to data. Indices can be created on any combination 
of attributes on a table. Queries that filter using those attributes can find matching records 
randomly using the index, without having to check each record in turn. Another advantage is that 
the relationships established between tables eliminate the duplication of data, which in turn 
prevents data manipulation anomalies and loss of data integrity. 
In order to create the study‟s database, I developed a group of SQL programs that performed 
the following tasks: (1) data gathering from annual statements, (2) sample selection; (3) 
calculation of measures; (4) creation of observations; and (5) data consolidation for subsequent 
statistical analysis. 
(1) Data gathering. There is a particular layout of the data for each report of the NAIC annual 
statement. The first task is then to identify the source file in the annual statement database that 
contains the data I need. Next, I develop SAS programs that read the annual statement database 
and that record the chosen variables in relational tables. The resulting tables are the input for the 
subsequent programs. 
(2) Sample selection. Multimarket contact – one of the most important measures in the study – 
is a relational measure, as it takes into account the overlap of contacts that a focal firm has with 
incumbents outside the focal market. Hence, the group of firms to be considered competitors, i.e. 
the sample of firms must be defined before the measure is calculated. Consequently, whenever 
the sample criteria change, the measure needs to be recalculated. The criteria for sample 
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selection are described in section 5.2. The SQL program deletes the insurers that do not meet the 
criteria, creating the input for the next program.  
(3) Calculation of measures. This SQL program calculates the measures of the study (e.g. 
multimarket contact, Herfindhal index, aspiration levels, density, market experience, etc). The 
calculation is described in section 5.2. The results are stored in SQL tables to be used in the next 
process.  
(4) Creation of observations. The SAS program reads the SQL tables previously recorded and 
create individual observations (rows) containing values for the dependent, independent, and 
control variables. 
(5) Data consolidation. The SAS program combines the individual tables recorded for each year 
into a single file for Stata sofware. Since there is an individual NAIC database for each year of 
observation, I must run steps 1 through 4 twenty times, one for each year of observation. 
Because processing time increases exponentially with the number of firms and years of 
observation, the process would take on average 20 hours to complete in a regular single 
processor computer. Thus, in order to optimize time and resources, I run the SAS programs in an 
IBM System p5, a supercomputer suitable for research computing.  
 
5.2. Sample 
This dissertation encompasses data for the 1998-2008 period. The potential sample of firms 
consists of all property-liability insurers writing two specific types of insurance: homeowners 
and private passenger automobile insurance. These lines were chosen because they are B2C 
(Business to Consumer) transactions, representing almost half of total book-of-business in 
property-liability insurance industry. Firms operating in these markets are likely to compete 
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head-to-head with little differentiation, whereas B2B (Business to Business) lines require 
specialized underwriting capabilities, which may mask the effects of multimarket contact. Since 
there are 51 geographic markets (50 states and D.C.) and 2 product markets (homeowners and 
private passenger automobile), the maximum number of geo-product markets in this study is 102 
geo-product markets. 
Insurance companies may be structured as a single insurer or as an affiliate of an insurance 
group. For example, a single insurer may operate in several states, or an insurance group may set 
up multiple affiliates to cover different geographic areas or types of business. Since this 
dissertation examines the scope of geo-product markets served by each insurance company 
regardless of how the company is structured – as a single insurer or as a set of affiliated 
companies – I consolidated single insurers that belong to the same group as one observation unit 
in my sample. In the case where multiple insurers are grouped as one unit, the values for dummy 
variables are based on the lead insurer in the group, and continuous variables (e.g. assets, 
premiums, etc) are constructed by aggregating values of all firms in the group. 
 Insurers with negative assets or negative values on any other important financial information 
(e.g. surplus or revenues) were deleted. Moreover, following cut-off criteria commonly used in 
property-liability insurance research (e.g. Choi Weiss 2005), I deleted firms with a low market 
share, because very small companies are less likely to have a significant impact on price and 
supply in the state market. The final sample consists of approximately 93 firms per year, 
representing 91% of revenues and 90% of assets of the firms writing homeowners and private 
auto insurance. The sample consisted of 94.795 firm-year-observations between 1999 and 2008
1
. 
The data take the form of one observation per firm per market segment per year.  
                                                 
1
 The observations for year 1998 are lost because of the lagging of all independent variables by one year. 
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 Figures 5.1 through 5.2 shows trends in the industry over the decade covered by this 
analysis. Total revenues have increased over the years, whereas the number of firms competing 
in the industry has varied. On average, firms operate in 15 markets per year. The sample contains 
25% of mutual firms and 75% of stock firms.  
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Figure 5.1 –Total revenue (premiums earned) per year 
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Figure 5.2 – Number of firms per year 
 
5.3. Measurement 
5.3.1. Dependent Variables 
- Market entry: This variable is measured as a dichotomous variable. For each market a 
company can potentially enter in each year, a value of one is represented in the event of entry 
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into the geo-product market by that company in that year. A value of zero indicates that no entry 
was made by the company into the particular geo-product market during the year. I adopted the 
assumption that each company of the sample can potentially enter any of the markets in which it 
is not operating.  
- Market exit: This variable is measured as a dichotomous variable. For each geo-product 
market a company is operating in each year, a value of one indicates exit from the focal market 
by that company in the following year. A value of zero indicates that the company continues to 
operate in that particular geo-product market in the following year. That means that I adopted the 
assumption that each company of the sample can potentially exit from any of the markets in 
which it is currently operating. I define market exit as a firm‟s withdrawal from a market, 
irrespective of exit mode (e.g. divestiture). To identify exit, I compare a firm‟s portfolio of 
markets in year t with a firm‟s portfolio of markets in year t-1. 
 
5.3.2. Independent Variables 
- Multimarket contact: As described in Chapter 2, when choosing a measure of multimarket 
contact, one must make decisions regarding level of analysis, scaling, and weighing. Multimarket 
contact can be measured at several levels: dyadic, firm-in-market, firm-, and market levels 
(Gimeno & Jeong 2001).  I opt to use the firm-market level measure because it captures the 
extent to which a firm‟s scope of business, outside of a focal market, is similar to other firms 
competing in that market. Multimarket contact at the dyad level is not appropriate for this study 
because I cannot determine the specific competitor toward whom a specific market entry or exit 
decision is aimed (Gimeno and Jeong 2001). Regarding scaling, I opt to scale the measure since 
scaling allows me to distinguish between a firm with 4 markets shared with rivals out of a 
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possible total of 4 in which it currently competes, and one that shares 4 markets out of a total of 
40. Thus, I calculate the average percentage of markets that a focal company shares with the 
firms already competing in the focal market. Finally, I opt to weigh the measure according to the 
importance of the overlapping markets to the focal market. For example, the focal company A 
can potentially enter the state of Georgia in which companies B and C are already operating. If 
company A also meets with company B in the state of New York, which represents 80% of 
company A‟s revenues, as well as meets with company C in the state of Arizona, which 
represents 20% of company A‟s revenues, then A‟s contact with B would be more important than 
A‟s contact with C. The weight is the percentage of the focal firm‟s premium written obtained in 
the market. The measure is defined as: 
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where imtMMC  is the multimarket contact of firm i in market m at time t; imtI  is an indicator 
variable set equal to one if firm i is active in market m at time t and zero otherwise; jmtI  is an 
indicator variable set equal to one if firm j is active in market m at time t and zero otherwise; and 
imt
w is the weight of market m for the focal firm I at time t relative to all markets it operates.  
 
- Firm performance: Previous studies with samples of insurance firms have used loss ratio as a 
measure of profitability (e.g. Greve, 2008a), which captures the firm‟s underwriting 
performance. I use a form of operating ratio to gauge an insurer‟s profitability, which combines 
both underwriting and investment results. It is important that investment results be considered 
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because insurance firms generate substantial amounts of investable funds, and the return on 
investments may offset unprofitable underwriting activities in a given year. Operating ratio is 
calculated as follows:   
Operating Ratio = (Loss Ratio + Expense Ratio) – Investment Income Ratio 
where 
Loss Ratio = 
edemiumsEarn
esmentExpensLossAdjustrredLossesIncu
Pr

 
Expense Ratio = 
tenemiumsWrit
curredExpensesIn
Pr
 
Investment Income Ratio = 
edemiumsEarn
entIncomeNetInvestm
Pr
 
 
Data from income statements and balance sheets are used to calculate these ratios. When a firm 
has an operating ratio of less than 100, this indicates that it is able to generate a profit from its 
operations and investments. I subtracted the operating ratio from 100 percent so that the measure 
can reflect the percentage profit margin.  
 
- Aspiration level: I calculated the measure of aspiration level as a mixture of past-period 
aspiration level and the previous performance of the focal firm, defined as a weighted moving 
average (Levinthal & March, 1981). Historical aspiration level is calculated as 
11 )1(   ttt PaaAA ,  where A is the aspiration level, P is the performance, t is year, and a is 
the weight given to the most recent aspiration level.  
- Performance relative to aspiration level: Also known as attainment discrepancy (Lant 1992), 
this variable represents the gap between actual performance and expected goals. Performance 
relative to aspiration level is calculated by subtracting aspiration level from actual performance 
achieved. Thus, when performance exceeds aspiration level, performance relative to aspiration 
level is positive. When performance is below aspiration level, performance relative to aspiration 
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level is negative. Because the behavioral theory of the firm predicts different risk preferences for 
firms that perform above and below aspiration level, a common way of operationalizing this 
variable is to include elements of a spline function (Greve, 1998). A spline this function avoids 
inappropriate “jumps” in the estimated Y values due to changes in slope. Consistent with prior 
studies (e.g. Audia & Greve, 2006; Greve, 1998), I estimated two spline dummy variables, one 
for performance above aspiration level and another for performance below aspiration level. The 
former takes the value of the performance minus aspiration level if performance is greater than 
or equal aspiration level and zero otherwise. The latter takes the value of the performance minus 
aspiration level if performance is less than aspiration level and zero otherwise. Consequently, the 
model can estimate distinct coefficients on the performance above and performance below 
aspiration level.  
- Organizational slack: Consistent with results from recent studies (e.g. Iyer and Miller, 2008; 
Shimizu 2007), I use liquidity ratio, calculated as total assets divided by current liabilities. 
Consistent with Audia and Greve (2006), I normalized slack between 0 and 1:  The firm with 
lowest slack has a score of 0 and the firm with highest slack has a score of 1. All other firms 
have a score in between. The normalization is important because the shifting-focus model of risk 
taking contends that slack affects decision makers‟ choice of the referent point and that this 
choice affects risk preference: Large slack lowers the survival point, whereas small slack raises 
it. Normalizing slack allows us to observe distinct effects for low and high slack. An alternative 
operationalization such as a centered slack does not capture this distinction. 
 
5.3.3. Control Variables 
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In order to avoid spurious correlations, I control for several alternatives explanations for market 
entry and exit at the firm- and market level. 
Firm characteristics. I control for firm size, measured as the logarithm of total admitted assets. I 
also control for type of firm – mutual or stock. Managers in mutual and stock firms may have 
different goals – managers in stock firms seek to maximize profits, whereas managers in mutual 
firms seek to minimize losses. The indicator variable is 0 for stock and 1 for mutual firms. To 
account for organizational learning explanations (Amburgey & Miner 1993), I include two 
variables: market experience and entry experience. The former is operationalized as the number 
of markets in which the firm operates at t – 1, and the latter, as the number of entries of firm i at t 
– 1.  
Market characteristics. To account for population ecology explanations (Hannan & Freeman 
1982), I include density and density squared in the model, measured as the number of firms 
operating in the target market at t - 1. I also control for mimetic explanations of market entry 
(Haveman 1993), defined as market attractiveness. This variable is measured as the number of 
entries into the target market at t – 1. To control for oligopoly theory explanations (Scherer & 
Ross, I used market concentration, operationalized as the Herfindahl index (Baum & Korn, 
1996; Fuentelsaz & Gomez, 2006; Stephan et al., 2003). Market and regional differences are 
controlled for in the model specification.  
 
5.4. Data Analysis 
This dissertation examines market entry and exit patterns occurring over time. The main goal 
is to understand how interactions between the competition-related and firm-specific factors affect 
a firm‟s likelihood of entering into or exiting from markets. Thus, my hypotheses deal with 
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causal relationships as well as involve binary dependent variables. Both logistic regression and 
event history modeling are estimation techniques used for this kind of empirical analysis. 
However, since the characteristics of the process under study „guide‟ design decisions (Coleman 
1981), it is important to understand the characteristics associated with multimarket studies and 
choose the method that effectively deals with such issues.   
First, this study uses a panel data sample that provides multiple observations on each firm in 
the sample, incorporating cross-sectional and time-varying variables. In such an empirical setting 
researchers are urged to control for unobserved heterogeneity, which occurs when some 
unobserved variables correlate with the observed independent and dependent variables. Hence, 
the method must provide techniques for dealing with unobserved heterogeneity. Second, a 
critical assumption in multimarket studies is that firms attempt to coordinate their actions across 
markets. Thus, the common assumption of independence of observations is violated, since some 
of a firm‟s moves may be part of a coordinated strategy. Hence, the statistical method must deal 
with this issue effectively. Both logistic regression and event history methods are briefly 
described and compared in turn. 
 
5.4.1 Logistic regression modeling  
Logistic regression belongs to the group of regression methods for describing the relationship 
between explanatory variables and a discrete response variable. The difference between ordinary 
least square (OLS) regression and logistic regression modeling lies in the fact that for linear 
regression the response variable Y is continuous, which is one of the classical assumptions for 
ordinary least squares to yield BLUE estimators. When this assumption is unmet, OLS poses 
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serious inference problems. Consequently, when the response variable is discrete, maximum 
likelihood techniques such as logistic regression are generally more efficient.  
To obtain the logistic model, one must start from the linear probability model, which is a 
linear sum determined by constant, unknown parameters i , independent variables denoted as ix  
and an error term:  
P(of_occurring_the_event) =   X      (Equation 5.1) 
 
Since the linear model suffers from estimates lying outside the [0, 1] range, the linear model 
must be transformed to a non-linear logistic model (equations 2 and 3):  
 
  X
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A logit model ensures that the probabilities will be within the [0, 1] range. The model also 
assumes that errors follow a binomial distribution, which approximates a normal distribution for 
large samples (Coleman, 1981).  
There are two different ways to estimate the coefficients and control for unobserved 
heterogeneity: the fixed effects approach and the random effects approach. Controlling for fixed 
effects involves the estimation of intercept terms, which are operationalized as dummy variables. 
This technique accounts for effects that are likely to differ between markets, firms, or firm-in-
markets, but remain constant for multiple observations (Greene 2003). The random effects 
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estimation assumes that the individual-specific intercepts are random-drawings from an unknown 
distribution. Hausman‟s (1978) test can help determine the most appropriate approach to model 
the intercepts.  
Regarding the lack of independence of observations, previous multimarket studies propose 
some techniques to minimize the biasing effects. Barnett (1993) considers multimarket firms 
oversampled within the dataset and proposes a technique in which observations in the dataset are 
inversely weighted based on their degree of overrepresentation as a function of the multimarket 
ties of a particular firm. This technique minimizes the biasing effect due to oversampling and has 
been used by many multimarket studies (e.g. Baum and Korn 1996; Boeker et al. 1997; Stephan 
et al. 2003).  
I now describe the event history methodology, highlighting its features that set it apart from 
logit and other traditional regression models. 
 
5.4.2 Event history modeling 
Event history modeling is a method for causal analysis of processes characterized in the 
following way: (1) there is a collection of units (e.g. individuals, firms, societies, etc), each 
moving among a finite number of states in a state space; (2) these changes (or events) may occur 
at any point in time; and (3) there are time-constant and/or time-dependent factors influencing 
the events (Coleman 1981, p. 6).  
In other words, causal statements in event history modeling are examined by looking at 
conditions that change over time. These changes are events – an event is a change in a variable – 
and that happens at a specific point in time. The role of the event is to indicate that a causal 
factor has changed at a specific time and that the unit under study is exposed to another causal 
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condition (Blossfeld, Golsch, and Rohwer 2007). Causal statements can be summarized in the 
following way: 
)Pr( 'tt YX      t’ > t       (Equation 5.4) 
 
This means that a change in tX  will change the probability that the dependent variable 
,t
Y will change in the future (t’ > t). Although logistic regression models also estimate 
probabilities, event history models offer an additional feature: a time-related representation for 
the causal effect. This idea can be explained with equations. First, suppose that T is a random 
variable that represents the duration until a change in the dependent variable occurs. Then, the 
transition probability can be defined as: 
)|'Pr( tTtTt       t  < t’     (Equation 5.5) 
 
This is the probability that an event occurs in the time interval from t to t’. The probability 
of future changes in the dependent variable per unit of time is defined as the ratio of the 
transition probability to the length of the time interval: 
tt
tTtTt
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        (Equation 5.6) 
 
Finally, the transition rate is defined as 
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tTtTt
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'
       (Equation 5.7) 
where r(t) is the instantaneous rate of occurring the event.  It can be interpreted as the propensity 
to change the state, from origin state j to a destination state k, at time t. Again, this means that 
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r(t) is a transition rate, not a transition probability, particularly because it can be greater than 1. 
For instance, if r(t) is constant over time, say r(t) = 1.25, then 1.25 is the expected number of 
events in a time interval that is one unit long. Alternatively, 1/r(t) gives the expected length of 
time until an event occurs, in this case .80 time units. This way of defining the hazard rate also 
closely corresponds to intuitive notions of risk. For example, if two persons have hazard rates of 
.5 and 1.5, it is appropriate to say that the second person‟s risk of an event is three times greater 
(Allison, 1982).  
 The transition rate is often referred to as a hazard rate. The term hazard comes from 
biostatistics, where the typical event is death (Allison 1984). The term transition rate is more 
often used in sociology, where many analyses have been made of transitions between discrete 
states, such as marital and employment statuses (Yamaguchi 1991). In strategy, the term hazard 
rate is more commonly employed than transition rate. Hence, I use the term hazard rate in this 
dissertation.  
The hazard rate provides the possibility of giving a time–related description of how the 
process under study evolves over time. Yet it is important to realize that although the models are 
called time-dependent, time itself is not a causal factor. Time dependence can be interpreted as a 
proxy for time-varying causal factors that are difficult to observe (Tuma and Hannan 1984). For 
instance, using event history methodology, Gimeno et al. (2005) were able to accommodate 
unobservable factors beyond mimetic processes that may influence the rate of a firm‟s entry into 
a host country. Time dependence might also be seen as a result of a diffusion process, in which 
some sort of contagion, imitation, or simply social pressure drives the process under study 
(Greve, Strang, and Tuma 1995).  
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Figure 5.1 illustrates different examples of how the effect of x on y develops in time. In Figure 
5.1(a), the effect of x on y is time-dependent as it increases over time. Consequently, the hazard 
rate is affected by both change in the covariates and the passing of time. A somewhat similar 
effect is also shown in Figure 5.1(b), in which a cyclical effect pattern is described over time. In 
Figure 5.1(c), the effect of x on y is time-constant, that is to say the effect of x on y does not 
change with the passing of time. In this case, the transition rate is a function of the explanatory 
variables only, a situation akin to traditional regression models. 
Statistically, there are many possibilities for specifying the functional form of the hazard rate. 
On one hand, parametric event history models assume that the shape of time dependence for the 
hazard rate can be modeled as a known distribution, such as exponential, Weibull, Gompertz, 
lognormal, or gamma, to name a few.  For instance, in a parametric model with Gompertz 
distribution – a model successfully applied in studying the lifetime of organizations (Freeman, 
Carroll, and Hannan 1983) – the hazard rate is assumed to decrease monotonically with time. 
The choice of one distribution over another is usually grounded on theory or previous empirical 
research (Allison 1984), but researchers can also use methods for assessing which model 
provides a better fit to the data, as described in Blossfeld et al. (2007).  
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Figure 5.1 – Temporal shapes of how a change in x effects a change in y 
 
On the other hand, semi-parametric event history models represent a more flexible way to 
handle time dependence, since these models assume time dependence without specifying its form 
(Yamaguchi 1991). The most widely applied semi-parametric model is the proportional hazards 
model, which is based on an estimation approach proposed by Cox (1972).  The proportional 
hazards model assumes that hazard rates are a log linear function of parameters for the effects of 
covariates (Yamaguchi 1991). For example, the hazard rate of entry by firm i in market m at time 
t may be written as  
))(exp()()( 0 tXthth imim         (Equation 5.8) 
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where the hazard rate, is the product of an unspecified baseline rate, )(0 th , and a vector of 
independent and control variables, X.  
Researchers can also estimate stratified event-history models (Blossfeld et al., 2007). In a 
stratified model the baseline rate )(0 th can be different for each category of a specific 
explanatory variable. In other words, the baseline hazards are allowed to differ by group, 
although the coefficients are constrained to be the same. For example, in a sample of 
multinational firms, competitive conditions may vary depending on the host country in which 
firms operate. Hence, rather than assuming that all firms face the same baseline hazard,  a 
stratified model for this sample would include unique country-specific baseline hazard rates to 
account for host country differences. 
  
5.5 Model Specification and Estimation 
Consistent with prior studies in multimarket competition and behavioral theory (e.g. Barnett 
1993; Haveman and Nonnemaker, 2000; Iyer and Miller, 2008), I opted to use event history 
modeling. The distributions for time to an event like market entry or exit might be dissimilar 
from normal, as they are almost certaintly nonsymmetic. Thus, the problem of logistic linear 
regression to analyze survival data is with the assumed normality of the residuals. Moreover, in 
analyzing entry, censoring may occur when a firm no longer operates in a given market or when 
entry has not occurred until the end of the study. Event history models effectively deal with 
nonnormality and censoring issues.  
This methodology also permits that the observations for the same entity to be divided into 
groups of independent observations to account for the correlation between observations 
belonging to the same firm. This aspect is important in this dissertation, as a focal firm can enter 
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several markets in a given year and such decisions are not independent. Furthermore, event-
history stratified models permit the estimation of a distinct baseline rate for each market, so that 
any idiosyncrasies of the market (e.g. stringent state market in terms of state regulations) can be 
controlled for.  
In this dissertation I estimate a stratified proportional hazards model. As above mentioned, 
proportional hazards models represent a flexible way to handle time dependence, provided that 
the sample satisfies the proportionality assumption. I test this assumption and present the results 
in Chapter 6.  
My theoretical model presents empirical challenges as it integrates behavioral antecedents 
into multimarket competition. To translate this theoretical integration into a testable model, I 
combine empirical methods from prior research in both multimarket competition and the 
behavioral theory of the firm.  
The specification of my empirical model follows the theory. First, I create a baseline model 
with firm- and market-level control variables. Next, because my hypotheses build on the 
arguments from the behavioral theory of the firm and the shifting-focus model of risk taking, I 
test whether the behavioral predictions are supported. I start including the dummy variables for 
performance 1tspPerfBelowA  and 1tspPerfAboveA  , which represent the behavioral variables 
from the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963). Consistent with Audia and Greve 
(2006), I then include the normalized measure of slack and its interaction terms with 
performance above and below aspiration level: 1tSlack , 11   tt SlackspPerfBelowA , 
and 11   tt SlackspPerfAboveA . By including all these variables in the model, I am able to 
estimate effects of four conditions: (1) performance below aspiration level and low slack, (2) 
performance above aspiration level and low slack, (3) performance below aspiration level and 
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high slack, and (4) performance above aspiration level and high slack. Because the effect for the 
lowest-slack firm in the data is the main effect of firm performance, and the effect for the 
highest-slack firm in the data is the sum of the main effect of firm performance and slack, I 
interpret the effect of each condition as follows: 
- Condition 1: coefficient on 1tspPerfBelowA  
- Condition 2: coefficient on 1tspPerfAboveA  
- Condition 3: sum of coefficients ( 1tspPerfBelowA  + 11   tt SlackspPerfBelowA ) 
- Condition 4: sum of coefficients ( 1tspPerfAboveA  + 11   tt SlackspPerfAboveA ) 
In testing March and Shapira‟s model, risk aversion for performance below aspiration level 
and low slack indicates a positive coefficient on 1tspPerfBelowA  and risk seeking for 
performance below aspiration level and high slack indicates a negative sum of the coefficients 
( 1tspPerfBelowA  + 11   tt SlackspPerfBelowA ). Risk aversion for firms performing above 
aspiration level regardless of their level of slack indicates positive coefficients on both 
1tspPerfAboveA and 11   tt SlackspPerfAboveA . 
Next, I include the linear and quadratic terms for multimarket contact 1tMMC  
2
1tMMC  in the 
equation, representing the competitive antecedents of market entry.  
Thus far, I have included sets of variables for behavioral and competitive antecedents. To 
integrate the behavioral logic into the mutual forbearance logic, I created the following two- and 
three-way interactions
2
: 11   tt spPerfBelowAMMC , 11   tt spPerfAboveAMMC , 
11   tt SlackMMC , 111   ttt SlackspPerfBelowAMMC , 111   ttt SlackspPerfAboveAMMC . 
                                                 
2
 To remove nonessential multicolinearity, I centered the predictors before running the analysis. 
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The effects of the four behavioral conditions on the mutual forbearance logic are captured as 
follows: 
- Condition 1: coefficient on 11   tt spPerfBelowAMMC  
- Condition 2: coefficient on 11   tt spPerfAboveAMMC  
- Condition 3: sum of coefficients 
( 11   tt spPerfBelowAMMC  + 111   ttt SlackspPerfBelowAMMC ) 
- Condition 4: sum of coefficients 
( 11   tt spPerfAboveAMMC + 111   ttt SlackspPerfAboveAMMC ) 
All the interactions with 1tMMC  account for changes in both the threshold at which the 
forbearance effect starts to operate (the inflection point) and the magnitude of the inverted-U 
curve (the amplifying and attenuating effects). 
As mentioned in Section 5.3, my measures of market entry and exit are discrete (0 or 1) and 
my explanatory variables are a mix of continuous and discrete variables. Accordingly, I estimate 
a discrete-time stratified proportional hazards model
3
. The full equation for market entry is 
defined as follows: 
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where )(thim is the instantaneous hazard rate of firm i's entry into market m in t, )(0 th m is the 
baseline hazard rate for market m, and 1tC  is the vector of control variables. 
                                                 
3
 All of the empirical tests are run on the statistical computing package Stata 
(Equation 5.9) 
  96 
The implications of my hypotheses for the entry model coefficients are straightforward. The 
inverted-U curvilinear relationship between multimarket contact and market entry rates as 
predicted in the null hypothesis 0a indicates a positive coefficient on 1tMMC  and a negative 
coefficient on 
2
1tMMC . The moderating effect as predicted in Hypothesis 1a indicates a positive 
sum of the coefficients on 111   ttt SlackspPerfBelowAMMC  and 11   tt spPerfBelowAMMC , 
meaning that the effect of 1tMMC on market entry rates is amplified under conditions of 
performance below aspiration level and high slack.  Furthermore, the moderating effect as 
predicted in Hypothesis 2a indicates a negative coefficient on 11   tt spPerfBelowAMMC , 
meaning that the effect of 1tMMC on market entry rates is attenuated under conditions of 
performance below aspiration level and low slack.  Finally, the lack of a moderating effect for 
performance above aspiration level as predicted in Hypothesis 3a indicates non-significant 
coefficients on both 11   tt spPerfAboveAMMC  and 111   ttt SlackspPerfAboveAMMC .  
The full equation for market exit is defined as follows: 
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where )(thim is the instantaneous hazard rate of firm i's exit from market m in t, )(0 th m  the 
baseline hazard rate for market m, and 1tC  is the vector of control variables. 
The implications of my hypotheses for the exit model coefficients are also straightforward. 
The negative relationship between multimarket contact and market exit rates predicted in the null 
hypothesis 0b indicates a negative coefficient for 1tMMC .  
(Equation 5.10) 
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The moderating effect as predicted in Hypothesis 1b indicates a positive sum of the 
coefficients on 111   ttt SlackspPerfBelowAMMC  and 11   tt spPerfBelowAMMC , meaning 
that the effect of 1tMMC on market exit rates is attenuated under conditions of performance 
below aspiration level and high slack.  Furthermore, the moderating effect as predicted in 
Hypothesis 2b indicate a negative estimated coefficient on 11   tt spPerfBelowAMMC , meaning 
that the effect of 1tMMC on market exit rates is amplified under conditions of performance 
below aspiration level and low slack. Finally, the lack of moderating effects for performance 
above aspiration level as predicted in Hypothesis 3b indicates non-significant coefficients on 
11   tt spPerfAboveAMMC  and 111   ttt SlackspPerfAboveAMMC .  
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CHAPTER 6 – RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
 This chapter tests the hypotheses of the proposed research model of this dissertation and 
includes the following sections: (1) results and (2) discussion of findings.  
 
6.1 Results  
  Given that this study examines two distinct scope decisions, the results section is organized 
into two sub-sections, market entry and exit.  
6.1.1 Market Entry 
Means, standard deviations, ranges, and correlations are presented in Table 6.1. A look at the 
correlation matrix shows us no significantly high correlations between variables that could bias 
the estimates. Most importantly, the magnitude of correlations between the explanatory variables 
– MMC, slack, and performance above and below aspiration level – was low, indicating that 
multicollinearity was not a concern.  
Some correlations between control variables are noteworthy. Firms with experience in several 
markets seem to have greater entry experience (r = .22). Large firms tend to have experience in 
several markets (r = .53), but seem to avoid crowded markets (r = .14). Moreover, crowded 
markets seem to be attractive (r = .21) and not concentrated (r = -.44). 
 
------------------------------ 
Table 6.1 about here 
------------------------------ 
 
As mentioned in section 5.5, I use a discrete-time stratified proportional hazards model in my 
analysis. Because this model assumes proportionality, I must test whether this assumption is 
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satisfied. I run two tests, one based on reestimation (linktest function in Stata) and the other 
based on Schoenfeld (1982) residuals (estat phtest function in Stata). The former tests whether 
the model is correctly specified and the latter tests whether the log hazard-ratio is constant over 
time. There was no evidence that the proportional hazards assumption was violated.  
Tables 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 present the event-history analysis estimates of market entry at time t as 
a function on the firm‟s behavioral and competitive antecedents at time t – 1. Each table shows 
the coefficient estimates, standard errors, and tests for significance of each variable. For each 
model, the log likelihood statistic is given along with other statistics that indicate model fit. I also 
assess the multiplier effect of each statistically significant variable. The multipliers are calculated 
as )exp( x and describe the risk of experiencing market entry relative to the baseline hazard.  
Model 1 shows the baseline model, which contains the variables controlling for alternative 
market entry explanations. Firms are more likely to enter concentrated and crowded markets. A 
1-unit increase in market concentration increased the rate of entry by 91 percent and an 
additional firm operating in the target market increased the rate of entry by 23 percent Moreover, 
firms with experience in several markets and firms that have engaged in market entry activity in 
the previous year are more likely to expand into new markets in the next year. Indeed, as the 
number of markets in which the firm operated or the number of entries in the previous year 
increases by 1, the rate of entry increased by 3 percent. Mutual firms are less likely to enter new 
markets. In fact, being a mutual firm reduced entry rates by over half (100% - 48%) from what 
the rates for stock firms are. Firm size and market attractiveness had no significant effect on 
market entry rates. 
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Table 6.2 – Behavioral Antecedents of Market Entry 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Market concentration 0.65 *** (0.08) 0.65 *** (0.08) 0.64 *** (0.08) 
Market density 0.21 *** (0.02) 0.21 *** (0.02) 0.20 *** (0.02) 
Market density squared 0.00 *** (0.00) 0.00 *** (0.00) 0.00 *** (0.00) 
Market attractiveness 0.01  (0.04) 0.02  (0.04) 0.02  (0.05) 
Firm size -0.12  (0.11) -0.12  (0.11) -0.12  (0.11) 
Mutual -0.72 ** (0.27) -0.67 * (0.27) -0.58 * (0.26) 
Firm's market experience 0.03 *** (0.01) 0.03 *** (0.01) 0.03 *** (0.01) 
Firm's entry experience 0.03 *** (0.01) 0.03 *** (0.01) 0.03 *** (0.01) 
Performance above asp. Level    0.10  (0.53) -6.74 ** (2.21) 
Performance below asp. Level    -1.15  (0.74) 3.90 * (1.73) 
Slack       -1.47  (1.11) 
Performance above asp. level * Slack       15.28 ** (4.46) 
Performance below asp. level * Slack       -13.79 *** (3.25) 
          
Observations 55,963   55,963   55,963   
Likelihood ratio chi-square (df) 342.74 (8)  451.44 (10)  483.76 (13)  
Probability > chi-square 0.00   0.00   0.00   
Log-likelihood -7,392.43  -7,364.63  -7,256.31  
Log-likelihood ratio chi-square       55.60 ***   272.25 ***   
Robust estimates of standard errors are in parentheses. 
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
Log-likelihood ratio chi-square is relative to Model 1 
 
As mentioned in section 5.5, before testing the hypotheses of the study, I must test whether 
the shifting-focus model‟s predictions are supported. Model 2 adds the behavioral theory of the 
firm antecedents to the baseline model and shows that performance above and below aspiration 
level has a nonsignificant effect on market entry rates. Model 3 adds the interactions with slack. 
Because slack is normalized, the main effect now equals the effect on low slack firms and the 
main effect plus the interaction equals the effect on high slack firms. The significant estimates in 
Model 3 show that the nonsignificant effects in Model 2 were due to a blending of two opposite 
effects for firms with different levels of slack. Thus, the interactions with slack disentangled the 
effects of performance on low and high slack firms, which is consistent with Audia and Greve‟s 
(2006) findings. The main effect of performance below aspiration level has a positive effect on 
market entry rates, which indicates risk aversion in low-slack firms. The sum of the main effect 
  101 
and the interaction of performance below aspiration level and slack has a significant negative 
effect on market entry rates (3.90-13.79=-9.89, p < 0), which indicates risk seeking in high-slack 
firms. In this and all subsequent models that include interactions of slack and performance below 
aspiration level, the sum of the coefficients is negative, consistent with risk seeking in high slack 
firms. To clarify this interaction, I plotted the multiplier effect of performance below aspiration 
level on market entry rates over the observed range of performance below aspiration level at low 
and high levels of slack. 
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Figure 6.1 – Interactive effects of slack and performance below aspiration level on market 
entry rates 
 
The graph shows that when performance below aspiration level decreased by one standard 
deviation, market entry rates decreased by 41 percent for low-slack firms and increased by 31 
percent for high-slack firms.  Thus, low-slack firms are risk averse and high-slack firms are risk 
seekers with distance below aspiration level, which is consistent with March and Shapira‟s 
model.  
Regarding performance above aspiration level, the main effect has a negative and significant 
effect on market entry rates, which indicates risk aversion in low-slack firms. The sum of the 
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main effect and the interaction of performance above aspiration level and slack has a positive 
effect on market entry rates (-6.74+15.28 = 8.54, p < 0), which indicates risk seeking in high-
slack firms. In this and all subsequent models with interactions of slack and performance above 
aspiration level, the sum of the coefficients is positive, consistent with risk seeking in high slack 
firms. To clarify this interaction, I plotted the multiplier effect of performance above aspiration 
level on market entry rates over the observed range of performance above aspiration level at low 
and high levels of slack. 
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Figure 6.2 – Interactive effects of slack and performance above aspiration level on market entry 
rates 
 
The graph shows that when performance above aspiration level increased by one standard 
deviation, market entry rates decreased by 82 percent for low-slack firms and increased by 25 
percent for high-slack firms.  Thus, low-slack firms are risk averse and high-slack firms are risk 
seekers with distance above aspiration level. These results are not consistent with Audia and 
Greve (2006), as they found that large firms, irrespective of performance, are risk averse. 
However, these results are consistent with Baum et al. (2005) findings that performance far 
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above aspiration levels has a similar effect on risk taking as performance far below them. 
Furthermore, these findings resonates March and Shapira‟s (1992) contention that low slack 
firms do reduce risk.  
Table 6.3 presents main effects of behavioral and competitive antecedents on market entry 
rates. Before testing the moderating hypotheses of the study, I must test whether the mutual 
forbearance hypothesis (H0a) is supported. Model 4 adds the linear and quadratic terms of 
multimarket contact to the baseline model and shows an inverted-U-shaped effect of multimarket 
contact. Thus, H0a is supported. 
 
Table 6.3 – Behavioral and Competitive Antecedents of Market Entry (Main Effects) 
Variables Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Market concentration 0.63 *** (0.08) 0.63 *** (0.08) 0.62 *** (0.08) 
Market density 0.21 *** (0.02) 0.20 *** (0.02) 0.20 *** (0.02) 
Market density squared 0.00 *** (0.00) 0.00 *** (0.00) 0.00 *** (0.00) 
Market attractiveness 0.01  (0.04) 0.01  (0.04) 0.02  (0.04) 
Firm size -0.11  (0.12) -0.11  (0.12) -0.11  (0.12) 
Mutual -0.82 ** (0.24) -0.77 ** (0.23) -0.69 ** (0.23) 
Firm's market experience 0.03 *** (0.01) 0.03 *** (0.01) 0.03 *** (0.01) 
Firm's entry experience 0.03 *** (0.01) 0.03 *** (0.01) 0.03 *** (0.01) 
Performance above asp. Level    -0.01  (0.54) -7.03 ** (2.29) 
Performance below asp. Level    -1.01  (0.73) 3.76 * (1.72) 
Slack       -1.31  (1.15) 
Performance above asp. level * Slack       15.72 ** (4.57) 
Performance below asp. level * Slack       -13.03 *** (3.24) 
MMC 5.63 *** (1.38) 5.64 *** (1.36) 5.74 *** (1.43) 
MMC squared -11.16 * (5.20) -10.27 * (5.80) -9.72 * (4.90) 
          
Observations 55,963   55,963   55,963   
Likelihood ratio chi-square (df) 351.18 (10)  413.38 (12)  450.58 (15)  
Probability > chi-square 0.00   0.00   0.00   
Log-likelihood -7,225.96   -7,203.83   -7,097.65   
Log-likelihood ratio chi-square 332.95 ***   377.20 ***  589.57 ***   
Robust estimates of standard errors are in parentheses. 
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
Log-likelihood ratio chi-square is relative to Model 1 
  
  104 
Figure 6.3 presents the effect graphically. The inflection point of this curve occurs at a value 
of .24 for multimarket contact
4
, and lies within the observed range for multimarket contact (0 to 
1). Thus, as multimarket contact increases from 0 to .24, the rate of market entry also increases, 
reaching a multiplier effect of 1.98, which indicates that the level of multimarket contact at the 
threshold nearly doubled market entry rates. Above the threshold, the rate of entry starts to 
decrease, reaching a multiplier close to zero, which indicates that the rate of entry at the highest 
level of multimarket contact is decreased by almost 100%.  
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Figure 6.3 – Relationship between multimarket contact and market entry rates 
 
Model 5 adds performance above and below aspiration level and shows a negative but 
insignificant effect. However, the linear and quadratic terms for MMC remained significant. 
Model 6 adds the interactions of slack and performance relative to aspiration level and shows 
that the estimates became significant. The effect of performance below aspiration level on entry 
rates is positive for low-slack firms and negative for high-slack firms. Similar to the pattern of 
                                                 
4
 The threshold is calculated as the point where the first partial derivative of equation 5.9 with respect to 
multimarket contact is equal to zero. 
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nonsignificant effects found in model 2, the lack of significance in model 5 was due to a 
blending of two opposite effects for firms with different levels of slack. The log-likelihood for 
Model 6 was -7,097.65, which indicates a significant improvement in fit to data over either 
Model 3 (behavioral antecedents only, -7,256.31) or Model 4 (competitive antecedents only, -
7,225.96). Moreover, the estimates for the coefficients were significant and consistent with both 
the shifting-focus model and mutual forbearance predictions. This pattern of results suggests that 
behavioral and competitive antecedents together explain market entry behavior better than each 
set of antecedents individually.  
Models 7 and 8 in Table 6.4 present results for the interactive effects of behavioral and 
competitive antecedents, and enables me to test Hypotheses 1a, 2a, and 3a. Model 7 adds the 
interactions of MMC with performance above and below aspiration level. The coefficients on 
both interactions are nonsignificant and the linear and quadratic terms for MMC became 
nonsignificant. However, the coefficients on the interactions of slack and performance below and 
above aspiration level remained significant.  
Model 8 adds the three-way interactions of MMC with slack and performance above and 
below aspiration level. The coefficients on the interaction of MMC and performance below 
aspiration level now became significant. Similar to the patterns of results in Models 2 and 5, 
these results again suggest the nonsignificant effects in Model 7 were due to a blending of two 
opposite effects for firms with different levels of slack.  
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Table 6.4 – Behavioral and Competitive Antecedents of Market Entry (Interactive Effects) 
 
Variables Model 7 Model 8 
Market concentration 0.62 *** (0.08) 0.62 *** (0.08) 
Market density 0.20 *** (0.02) 0.20 *** (0.02) 
Market density squared 0.00 *** (0.00) 0.00 *** (0.00) 
Market attractiveness 0.02  (0.04) 0.02  (0.04) 
Firm size -0.11  (0.11) -0.11  (0.12) 
Mutual -0.70 ** (0.23) -0.70 ** (0.23) 
Firm's market experience 0.03 *** (0.01) 0.03 *** (0.01) 
Firm's entry experience 0.03 *** (0.01) 0.03 *** (0.01) 
Performance above asp. Level -7.16 ** (2.21) -7.34 ** (2.18) 
Performance below asp. Level 3.77 * (1.79) 4.17 * (1.74) 
Slack -1.40  (1.13) -1.52  (1.12) 
Performance above asp. level * Slack 15.99 *** (4.44) 16.37 *** (4.38) 
Performance below asp. level * Slack -13.10 *** (3.47) -14.00 *** (2.93) 
MMC 3.76  (2.94) 0.74  (3.67) 
MMC squared -9.88  (6.96) -10.13  (6.90) 
MMC * Performance above asp. Level -4.52  (5.58) -4.94  (18.94) 
MMC * Performance below asp. level 3.64  (5.10) -22.30 ** (8.52) 
MMC * Slack    12.43 † (7.91) 
MMC * Performance above asp. Level * Slack    -1.83  (35.14) 
MMC * Performance below asp. level * Slack    58.55 ** (19.78) 
       
Observations 55,963   55,963   
Likelihood ratio chi-square (df) 470.98 (18)   598.06 (20)   
Probability > chi-square 0.00   0.00   
Log-likelihood -7,092.81   -7,080.34   
Log-likelihood ratio chi-square 599.24 ***   624.19 ***   
Robust estimates of standard errors are in parentheses. 
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
Log-likelihood ratio chi-square is relative to Model 1 
  
 
Recall that the amplifying effect as predicted in hypothesis 1a requires a positive sum of the 
coefficients on the two-way and on the three-way interactions, that is to say, 
( 11   tt spPerfBelowAMMC ) + ( 111   ttt SlackspPerfBelowAMMC ) > 0. The sum of the 
coefficients is positive and significant (58.55 + (-22.30) = 36.25, p < 0). Therefore, H1a is 
supported.  
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To clarify this complex interaction, I graphed the effect of MMC on market entry rates over 
the observed range of MMC and calculated multipliers at three increasing levels of slack (μ, 
μ+1σ, μ+2σ), holding performance below aspiration level constant at the mean level. Figures 6.4 
and 6.5 show these effects. When slack equals .45 (μ), the maximum multiplier is 1.42 at a value 
of .30 for MMC; when slack equals .57 (μ + σ), the maximum multiplier is 1.88 at a value of .35 
for MMC, and when slack equals .69 (μ + 2σ), the maximum multiplier is 2.66 at a value of .40 
for MMC. Therefore, for abundant-slack firms, performance below aspiration level both 
amplified the effect of MMC on market entry rates and pushed the threshold away from the point 
where it would be under normal conditions.  
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Figure 6.4 – Amplifying effect of below-aspiration performance on market entry rates of 
high-slack firms 
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Figure 6.5 – Three-dimensional views of the amplifying effect on market entry rates 
 
Regarding hypothesis 2a, recall that the predicted attenuating effect requires a negative 
coefficient on the two-way interaction 11   tt spPerfBelowAMMC . The negative and significant 
coefficient indicates risk aversion. Therefore, hypothesis 2a is supported.  
To clarify this complex interaction, I graphed the effect of MMC on market entry rates over 
the observed range of MMC and calculated multipliers at three decreasing levels of slack (μ, μ-
1σ, μ-2σ), holding performance below aspiration level constant at the mean level. Figures 6.6 
and 6.7 show these effects. When slack equals .45 (μ), the maximum multiplier is 1.42 at a value 
of .30 for MMC; when slack equals .33 (μ - σ), the maximum multiplier is 1.14 at a value of .25 
for MMC, and when slack equals .21 (μ - 2σ), the maximum multiplier is 0.98 at a value of .20 
for MMC. Therefore, for limited-slack firms, performance below aspiration level both attenuated 
the effect of MMC on market entry rates and moved the threshold to the left from the point 
where it should be under normal conditions.  
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Figure 6.6 – Attenuating effect of below-aspiration performance on market entry rates low-
slack firms 
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Figure 6.7 – Three-dimensional views of the attenuating effect on market entry rates 
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Finally, Hypothesis 3a predicts that firms performing above aspiration level do not have 
incentives to disrupt the multimarket structures, meaning that performance above aspiration level 
does not moderate the relationship between MMC and market entry. Both the coefficient on the 
two-way interaction of MMC and performance above aspiration level and the coefficient on the 
three-way interaction of MMC, performance above aspiration level and slack are not significant.  
Thus, hypothesis 3a is supported.  
 
6.1.2 Market Exit  
Means, standard deviations, ranges, and correlations are presented in Table 6.5. A look at the 
correlation matrix shows us no significantly high correlations between variables that could bias 
the estimates. Similar to the results for market entry, the magnitude of correlations between the 
explanatory variables – MMC, slack, and performance above and below aspiration level – was 
low, indicating that multicollinearity was not a concern.  
------------------------------ 
Table 6.5 about here 
------------------------------ 
 
Tables 6.6, 6.7 and 6.8 present the event-history analysis estimates of market exit at time t as 
a function on the firm‟s behavioral and competitive antecedents at time t – 1. Each table shows 
the coefficient estimates, standard errors, and tests for significance of each variable. For each 
model, the log likelihood statistic is given along with other statistics that indicate model fit. I also 
assess the multiplier effect of each statistically significant variable. The multipliers are calculated 
as )exp( x and describe the risk of experiencing market exit relative to the baseline hazard. 
 Model 1 shows the baseline model. Firms are more likely to exit from concentrated and 
crowded markets. An increment of one standard deviation in market concentration increased exit 
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rates by 3 percent. Moreover, unlike the results for market entry, firms are more likely to exit 
from attractive markets. An increment of one standard deviation in market attractiveness 
increased exit rates by 12 percent. Firms with experience in several markets and mutual firms are 
less likely to exit from markets. In fact, mutual firms have exit rates that are half of the rates for 
stock firms. Entry experience and firm size had no significant effect on exit rates. 
 
Table 6.6 – Behavioral Antecedents of Market Exit 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Market concentration 0.61 *** (0.07) 0.61 *** (0.07) 0.61 *** (0.07) 
Market density 0.78 *** (0.05) 0.78 *** (0.05) 0.76 *** (0.05) 
Market density squared 0.00  (0.00) 0.00  (0.00) 0.00  (0.00) 
Market attractiveness 0.07 † (0.04) 0.08 * (0.04) 0.08 † (0.04) 
Firm size 0.06  (0.11) 0.05  (0.11) -0.01  (0.11) 
Mutual -1.64 ** (0.67) -1.57 ** (0.67) -1.14 † (0.64) 
Firm's market experience -0.01 * (0.01) -0.01 ** (0.01) -0.01 ** (0.01) 
Firm's entry experience -0.01  (0.02) -0.01  (0.02) -0.01  (0.01) 
Performance above asp. level    1.28 ** (0.76) 0.25  (1.35) 
Performance below asp. level    -1.47 *** (0.41) 0.95  (0.77) 
Slack       -6.76 ** (2.45) 
Performance above asp. level * slack       4.95  (9.39) 
Performance below asp. level * slack       -15.14 ** (6.83) 
          
          
Observations 40,224   40,224   40,224   
Likelihood ratio chi-square (df) 504.64   510.67   538.59   
Probability > chi-square 0.00   0.00   0.00   
Log-likelihood -12,294.61  -12,191.46  -11,838.28  
Log-likelihood ratio chi-square       206.29 ***   912.66 ***   
Robust estimates of standard errors are in parentheses. 
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
Log-likelihood ratio chi-square is relative to Model 1 
 
First, I test whether the March-Shapira‟s model is supported. Model 2 first adds performance 
below and above aspiration level to the baseline model. Unlike the results for market entry, 
performance above and below aspiration level have significant effects on market exit rates. To 
clarify these effects, I plotted the multiplier effect of performance above and below aspiration 
level on market exit rates over the observed range of performance. I followed Greve‟s (2003) 
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lead in constructing the figure. First, I set the multiplier at 1 at the origin and then varied 
performance below and above aspiration levels 2.5 standard deviations from the origin and 
computed new predicted values using the coefficient estimates of Model 2.  
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Figure 6.8 – Multiplier effect of distance from aspiration level on market exit rates 
 
As Figure 6.8 shows, the rate of exit decreases as performance increases below aspiration 
level, but changes its direction at aspiration level, increasing as performance increases above 
aspiration level. Thus, the behavioral logic that predicts different behaviors for performance 
above and below aspiration level is supported.  
Model 3 adds the interactions of performance relative to aspiration level and slack. Because 
slack is normalized, the main effect equals the effect on low slack firms and the main effect plus 
the interaction equals the effect on high slack firms. Unlike the results for market entry, only the 
coefficients on slack and on the interaction of slack and performance below aspiration level are 
statistically significant. Thus, March-Shapira‟s shifting-focus model is partially supported for 
market exit behavior.  
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Table 6.7 presents main effects of behavioral and competitive antecedents on market exit 
rates. Before testing the moderating hypotheses, I must test the mutual forbearance null 
hypothesis (H0b). Model 4 adds the linear term of multimarket contact to the baseline model and 
shows a negative effect of multimarket contact on market exit rates. Thus, hypothesis H0b is 
supported. At the average value for multimarket contact (µ = .78), the multiplier of exit rate is 
.33, which indicates the typical level of multimarket contact lowers exit rates by 67 percent.   
 
Table 6.7 – Behavioral and Competitive Antecedents of Market Exit (Main Effects) 
Variables Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Market concentration 0.62 *** (0.07) 0.62 *** (0.07) 0.62 *** (0.07) 
Market density 0.78 *** (0.05) 0.78 *** (0.05) 0.77 *** (0.05) 
Market density squared 0.00  (0.00) 0.00  (0.00) 0.00  (0.00) 
Market attractiveness 0.07 † (0.04) 0.08 * (0.04) 0.08 † (0.04) 
Firm size 0.06  (0.11) 0.05  (0.11) -0.01  (0.11) 
Mutual -1.62 ** (0.67) -1.54 * (0.67) -1.11 † (0.64) 
Firm's market experience -0.01 ** (0.01) -0.01 * (0.01) -0.01 ** (0.01) 
Firm's entry experience -0.01  (0.02) -0.01  (0.02) -0.01  (0.01) 
Performance above asp. Level    1.28 * (0.76) 0.14  (1.35) 
Performance below asp. Level    -1.47 *** (0.41) 0.99  (0.78) 
Slack       -6.85 ** (2.45) 
Performance above asp. level * slack       5.64  (9.53) 
Performance below asp. level * slack       -15.46 ** (6.94) 
MMC -1.41 * (0.79) -1.50 * (0.86) -1.64 * (0.90) 
          
Observations 40,224   40,224   40,224   
Likelihood ratio chi-square (df) 498.52   503.75   530.83   
Probability > chi-square 0.00   0.00   0.00   
Log-likelihood -12,280.69   -12,176.61   -11,821.19   
Log-likelihood ratio chi-square 27.85 ***   235.99 ***   946.83 ***   
Robust estimates of standard errors are in parentheses. 
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
Log-likelihood ratio chi-square is relative to Model 1 
  
 
Figure 6.9 presents this effect graphically. As multimarket contact increased from 0 to 1, the 
rate of market exit decreased, reaching a multiplier effect of .24, which indicates that the rate of 
exit at the highest level of multimarket contact is decreased by 76 percent.  
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Figure 6.9 – Relationship between multimarket contact and market exit rates 
 
Model 5 adds performance and shows a significant effect on exit rates above and below 
aspiration level. Performance below aspiration level has a negative estimate and performance 
above aspiration level has a positive estimate, a pattern similar to Model 2. Model 6 adds the 
interactions of slack and performance relative to aspiration level and yields coefficients similar 
to the ones in Model 3.  
Models 7 and 8 in Table 6.8 present results for the interactive effects of behavioral and 
competitive antecedents. Model 7 adds the interactions of MMC with performance above and 
below aspiration level. The coefficients on both interactions are nonsignificant. Model 8 adds the 
three-way interactions of MMC with slack and performance above and below aspiration level, 
and enables me to test Hypotheses 1b, 2b, and 3b.  
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Table 6.8 – Behavioral and Competitive Antecedents of Market Exit (Interactive Effects) 
 
Variables Model 7 Model 8 
Market concentration 0.62 *** (0.07) 0.62 *** (0.07) 
Market density 0.76 *** (0.05) 0.77 *** (0.05) 
Market density squared 0.00  (0.00) 0.00  (0.00) 
Market attractiveness 0.08 * (0.04) 0.08 * (0.04) 
Firm size -0.01  (0.11) -0.02  (0.11) 
Mutual -1.10 † (0.64) -1.12 † (0.65) 
Firm's market experience -0.01 ** (0.01) -0.01 ** (0.01) 
Firm's entry experience -0.01  (0.01) -0.01  (0.01) 
Performance above asp. Level -0.44  (1.55) -0.15  (1.58) 
Performance below asp. Level 1.04  (0.79) 1.01  (0.77) 
Slack -6.96 ** (2.47) -6.87 ** (2.43) 
Performance above asp. level * slack 7.75  (9.51) 6.64  (9.59) 
Performance below asp. level * slack -15.68 ** (7.00) -15.63 ** (6.97) 
MMC -1.41 † (0.91) -3.48 * (1.90) 
MMC * Performance above asp. Level -5.16  (4.76) 2.55  (7.46) 
MMC * Performance below asp. Level 0.43  (2.72) -3.34 * (1.15) 
MMC * Slack    10.30 † (6.72) 
MMC * Performance above asp. level * slack    -50.15  (36.94) 
MMC * Performance below asp. level * slack    25.67 * (14.37) 
       
Observations 40,224   40,224   
Likelihood ratio chi-square (df) 567.91   566.72   
Probability > chi-square 0.00   0.00   
Log-likelihood -11,816.66   -11,810.13   
Log-likelihood ratio chi-square 955.91 ***   968.96 ***   
Robust estimates of standard errors are in parentheses. 
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
Log-likelihood ratio chi-square is relative to Model 1 
  
 
Recall that the attenuating effect as predicted in hypothesis 1b requires a positive sum of the 
coefficients on the two-way and on the three-way interactions, that is to say, 
( 11   tt spPerfBelowAMMC ) + ( 111   ttt SlackspPerfBelowAMMC ) > 0. The sum of the 
coefficients is positive and significant (25.67 + (-3.34) = 22.33, p < 0), indicating risk seeking. 
Therefore, H1b is supported.  
To clarify this complex interaction, I graphed the effect of MMC on market exit rates over the 
observed range of MMC and calculated multipliers at three increasing levels of slack (μ, μ+1σ, 
μ+2σ), holding performance below aspiration level constant at the mean level. As shown in 
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Figures 6.10 and 6.11, increasing levels of slack retard the effect of multimarket contact on 
market exit rates. 
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Figure 6.10 – Attenuating effect of below-aspiration performance on market exit rates of high-slack 
firms 
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Figure 6.11 – Three-dimensional views of the attenuating effect on market exit rates 
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Regarding hypothesis 2b, recall that the predicted amplifying effect requires a negative 
coefficient on the two-way interaction 11   tt spPerfBelowAMMC . The negative and significant 
coefficient indicates risk aversion. Therefore, hypothesis 2a is supported. 
To clarify this complex interaction, I graphed the effect of MMC on market exit rates over the 
observed range of MMC and calculated multipliers at three decreasing levels of slack (μ, μ-1σ, 
μ-2σ), holding performance below aspiration level constant at the mean level. As shown in 
Figures 6.12 and 6.13, decreasing levels of slack accelerates the effect of multimarket contact on 
market exit rates.  
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Figure 6.12 – Amplifying effect of below-aspiration performance on market exit rates of 
low-slack firms 
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Figure 6.713 – Three-dimensional views of the amplifying effect on market exit rates 
 
Finally, Hypothesis 3b predicts that firms performing above aspiration level do not have 
incentives to disrupt the multimarket structures, meaning that performance above aspiration level 
does not moderate the relationship between multimarket contact and market exit. Both the 
coefficient on the two-way and three-way interactions of MMC, performance above aspiration 
level and slack are not significant.  Thus, hypothesis 3b is supported.  
 
6.2 Discussion 
Due to the nature of the hypothesized effects of the competitive and behavioral antecedents 
on corporate strategic decisions, I tested direct and moderating effects of the respective variables. 
Table 6.9 summarizes the findings, which are discussed in turn. 
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Table 7.1 – Summary of Empirical Results 
Moderators Market Entry Market Exit 
Baseline model (mutual forbearance 
hypothesis) 
inverted-U-shaped relationship 
H0a supported 
negative relationship 
H0b supported 
Performance below aspiration level and  
high slack 
amplifying effect 
H1a supported 
attenuating effect 
H1b supported 
Performance below aspiration level and  
low slack 
attenuating effect 
H2a supported 
amplifying effect 
H2b supported 
Performance above aspiration level, 
irrespective of the level of slack resources 
no effect 
H3a supported 
no effect 
H3b supported 
 
6.2.1 Competitive antecedents of market entry and exit 
The results provide strong support for the mutual forbearance null hypotheses with respect 
to market entry and exit. Consistent with findings in prior research on market entry (Haveman & 
Nonnemaker, 2000; Baum & Korn, 1999; Stephan et al., 2003, Fuentelsaz & Gomez, 2006), 
insurance firms do take into account the level of multimarket contact as they enter into new 
markets.  Between low to moderate levels of multimarket contact, firms have an incentive to 
build deterrence capability. The results show that entry rates first increases, up to a threshold of 
multimarket contact that nearly doubles entry rates. Beyond the threshold, firms recognize their 
extended interdependence with rivals and refrain from entering into markets with high 
multimarket contact, which explains multipliers close to zero at very high levels of multimarket 
contact.  
The results for market exit complement this rationale, in that once firms establish mutual 
footholds with rivals, they are unlikely to abandon them. Consistent with previous studies in 
market exit (Barnett, 1993, Baum & Korn, 1996; Boeker et al. 1997), the results show strong 
support for the negative relationship between multimarket contact and exit rates. Thus, insurance 
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firms are more likely to exit from markets with low levels of multimarket contact than those with 
high levels of multimarket contact.  
It is worthwhile to discuss an exception in the market exit literature. Barn and Korn (1999) 
is the only study that predicted an inverted-U-shaped relationship between multimarket contact 
and exit rates, meaning that both entry and exit follow similar patterns. In order to explain the 
rise in exit rates between low and moderate levels of multimarket contact, they introduced the 
idea of exit as an outcome of competitive interaction or, in other words, exit as a forced strategy. 
For the decline in exit rates beyond the threshold, they consider exit as a strategic move, 
applying the mutual forbearance argument. Thus, they conceptualize exit differently according to 
the level of multimarket contact. Because I defined market exit as a decision rather than an 
outcome and applied this definition across the entire range of multimarket contact, my theoretical 
model builds on prior research and only considers the negative relationship between multimarket 
contact and exit rates.  
Nevertheless, I investigated the possibility of an inverted-U curve for market exit in this 
sample. My motivation was the fact that Baum and Korn (1999) reported contradictory findings 
between that study and their previous work. Baum and Korn (1996) found a negative coefficient 
on the linear term for multimarket contact, but, when they later added the quadratic term (Baum 
& Korn, 1999), the coefficient on the linear term became positive, and the coefficient on the 
quadratic term was negative, which indicates an inverted-U-shaped relationship between 
multimarket contact and exit rates. To rule out this possibility, I estimated an additional model, 
not shown in Table 6.7, in which I included a quadratic term for multimarket contact. The 
coefficient on the linear term was -3.61, which indicates that the coefficient remained negative, 
the coefficient on the quadratic term was -16.34, and both were significant at p < .01. This 
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pattern of results shows an accelerating decline in exit rates, which suggests that insurance firms 
are eager to keep the mutual footholds as the level of multimarket contact further increases. 
Thus, I did not find evidence of an inverted-U-curve for market exit decisions in the insurance 
industry.  
The nature of the industry and the period of observation can possibly explain these different 
results. Baum and Korn (1999) found the inverted-U-shaped curve for market exit in the airline 
industry in a period of observation following intense deregulation, whereas I tested my 
hypotheses in a mature, well established industry. This suggests that competitive dynamics 
seems to vary across different industries and time periods. Another plausible explanation is the 
fact that I examined geo-product markets. This departure from a traditional focus on geographic 
markets presents a more complete picture of the competitive environment that managers take 
into account when restructuring their firm‟s business scope. 
 
6.2.2 Behavioral antecedents of market entry and exit 
Because the theoretical model predicted moderating effects of behavioral antecedents on the 
mutual forbearance logic, it was important to examine the direct effect of these variables. I tested 
two behavioral models. First, I tested the original variables according to the behavioral theory of 
the firm (Cyert & March, 1963) and the prospect theory traditions (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979): 
performance above and below aspiration level. Second, because the predictions for performance 
below aspiration level are still controversial, I tested an outgrowth of the behavioral theory of the 
firm – the shifting focus model of risk taking (March & Shapira 1992). This model takes into 
account the moderating effect of organizational context on the reaction to performance feedback. 
I compared the results from these two models for market entry and exit. 
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Regarding market entry, I found that the shifting focus model offers a better explanation for 
market entry activity. The original behavioral variables (performance below and above aspiration 
level) became significant only when the organizational context (slack) is taken into account. For 
performance below aspiration level, the results are consistent with previous studies that tested 
March-Shapira model (Miller & Chen, 2004; Audia & Greve, 2006). Because the opportunities 
to recover from shortfall are more salient than the dangers associated with risk taking for high-
slack firms, these firms expand their business scope with distance below aspiration level. 
Conversely, for low-slack firms, the dangers associated with risk taking become more salient 
than its opportunities, preventing managers from pursuing risk. Thus, low-slack firms contract 
their business scope with distance below aspiration level.  
Interestingly, my findings disagree with Audia and Greve (2006) for performance above 
aspiration level. Whereas they found that the effect of performance above aspiration level is not 
significant, I found that low- and high slack firms performing above aspiration level have 
different risk preferences: Low-slack firms are risk averse and high-slack firms are risk seeking 
as performance above aspiration level increases. Nevertheless, these results are consistent with 
Baum, Rowley, Shipilov, and Chuang (2005) findings that performance far above aspiration 
levels has a similar effect on risk taking as performance far below them. Similarly, Iyer and 
Miller (2008) found risk seeking for performance above aspiration level in a study of acquisition 
behavior in manufacturing industries.  
In terms of exit behavior, the behavioral theory of the firm and prospect theory prediction for 
performance below aspiration level is supported. Exit rates increase with distance below 
aspiration level, which is consistent with previous studies (e.g. Shimizu, 2007). Interestingly, my 
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findings provide rare evidence of exit behavior when performance is above aspiration level.  In 
such condition, exit rates increases with distance above aspiration level.  
 
6.2.3 To forbear or not to forbear?  
The theoretical model of this study predicted that performance relative to aspiration level 
impacts managers‟ risk preference, which in turn, impacts whether firms follow or deviate from 
the mutual forbearance logic. This argument is strongly supported across all models for both 
market entry and exit. The skewed curves shown in Figures 6.4, 6.6, 6.8, and 6.10 depict the 
competitive behavior after the introduction of bounded rationality into the rational logic of the 
mutual forbearance hypothesis. The results show distinct competitive behaviors when firm 
performance is above and below aspiration level.  
Like other goals that firms pursue, abiding by the multimarket structures established with 
rivals is an organizational goal (Cyert and March, 1963). Firms pursue this competitive goal in 
order to benefit from the decreased levels of rivalry and enhanced performance that mutual 
forbearance provides. I found that firms are more likely to pursue competitive goals when 
performance goals are satisfied. This is true for firms performing above aspiration level and 
consistent with results from previous studies. For example, Greve (1998) found that high 
performing firms are less willing to abandon the multimarket strategy that generated the high 
performance in the first place, and more recently, Greve (2008) found that firms only attend to 
other goals when performance goals are satisfied. Thus, high performing firms do not have 
incentives to change their competitive behavior, and therefore, performance above aspiration 
level does not impact the forbearance-oriented market entry and exit behaviors.  
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The situation is quite different for firms performing below aspiration level. Low-performing 
firms deviate from the mutual forbearance logic because their performance goals are not 
satisfied. As predicted, performance below aspiration level impacts managers‟ risk preference, 
thus affecting how managers make decisions at the light of their firms‟ competitive environment. 
However, the effect of performance below aspiration level on mutual forbearance logic is 
contingent upon the organizational context. Abundant-slack firms perceive the discrepancy as a 
repairable gap, and therefore, are more likely to pursue risk in order to recover from the shortfall. 
Thus, performance below aspiration level for high slack firms amplifies the effect of multimarket 
contact on market entry and makes them take longer to forbear. On the other hand, low-slack 
firms perceive the discrepancy as a threat to firm survival, which induces risk aversion. Thus, 
resource-poor firms decrease entry rates and start forbearing sooner. Indeed, Figure 6.6 shows 
that for firms with very low levels of slack, entry rate almost declines monotonically with 
multimarket contact. 
The same effects for abundant- and limited-slack firms are also found in market exit 
behavior. Performance below aspiration level for high-slack firms attenuates the effect of 
multimarket contact on exit rates, significantly reducing them. On the other hand, performance 
below aspiration level for low-slack firms amplifies the multimarket effect, significantly 
increasing exit rates. These findings are consistent with previous divestiture studies. For 
instance, Chang (1996) found that high-resource firms divested not as often as low-resource 
firms when faced with the same performance gap, and Lieberman (1990) found that resource-
rich firms are able to decrease capacity incrementally when facing decline.  
 
6.2.4 Diversification through a geo-product lens 
  125 
Figure 6.15 depicts some tentative evidence of typical patterns of diversification. The figure 
plots the number of diversification events occurred across categories of diversification. 
Geographic diversification means previous experience in the target product market (same 
product market/new geographic market), and product diversification means previous 
experience in the target geographic market (same geographic market/new product market). 
Finally, geo-product diversification means experience in both the target product market (selling 
the same product in other geographic markets) and the target geographic market (selling other 
products in the geographic market).  
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Figure 6.14 – Patterns of diversification 
 
The figure shows interesting patterns of diversification over time. By far, firms tend to 
engage in geographic diversification. They have experience in the product market and expand 
geographically into new markets. Next, they engage in geo-product diversification, which 
indicates that they attempt to leverage both their product and local market knowledge. Only a 
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few events involve product diversification. In the context of the U.S. insurance industry, firms 
must have underwriting capabilities in order to write new types of insurance, and this may 
prevent them from diversifying into new product markets, even when they already operate in the 
target geographic market.  
These results suggest that that product and geographic dimensions are likely to be jointly 
considered when managers make decisions about the firm‟s scope. Firms first expand into new 
geographic markets, perhaps because product structures are easily replicated across new 
geographic locations, whereas entering into new business requires knowledge about the new 
product. Most importantly, firms attempt to combine their product experience in other 
geographic markets and knowledge in the local market by engaging in geo-product 
diversification. This descriptive evidence demonstrates the richness of examining diversification 
through a geo-product lens.  
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CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSION 
 
This final chapter includes two sections. The first section discusses the theoretical, 
empirical, and managerial implications of this dissertation. Limitations of this study and 
opportunities for future research are proposed in the last section. 
 
7.1 Implications 
This dissertation has theoretical, empirical and managerial implications, which are discussed 
in turn.  
Theoretical implications  
This dissertation breaks new ground in trying to understand how firms make decisions about 
their scope of business in the light of their internal and external environments. I believe that I 
make several contributions to theory, namely by addressing: (1) the behavioral boundary 
conditions of mutual forbearance, (2) exit decisions, (3) geo-product diversification, and (4) the 
competitive antecedents of corporate strategic decisions. 
First, this study challenges the completeness of our understanding of multimarket 
competition, due to prior research‟s sole reliance on rational-economic assumptions of 
competitive interaction. Except for a few studies (e.g. Stephan et al., 2003), the role of managers 
in multimarket competition research has been largely ignored. The results of this study 
underscore how predictions based on prior research are likely to be, at best, incomplete. For 
example, although the rational-economic view of mutual forbearance suggests that firms 
coordinate their actions in order to maximize profits, from a behavioral perspective, we know 
that firms avoid uncertainty (Cyert and March, 1963). In fact, because strategic management 
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looks at strategic decisions of managers, failure to incorporate a behavioral perspective into 
economic-rational models provides an incomplete understanding of our field. This study suggests 
that bringing a behavioral perspective into the theory of multimarket competition provides a 
more accurate picture of the competitive interactions among firms.  
In a broader perspective, this dissertation responds to long-standing calls for research 
integrating behavioral issues into rational-economic models. As Zajac and Bazerman (1991, p. 
52) noted “strategic management research may benefit from taking an integrated 
behavioral/economic perspective toward specific topics from the industrial organization 
economic literature.” In the same vein, Farjoun and Lai (1997, p. 271) encouraged strategy 
researchers “to design theoretical models that retain the elegance of rational analysis but also 
incorporate the reality of bounded rationality of decision makers.” The empirical evidence of this 
dissertation gives us an example of how our understanding can be greatly improved when 
integrating the rational-economic and cognitive perspectives into the same theoretical 
framework. Moreover, these results point to the importance of revisiting past studies. Indeed, the 
application of this integrative logic to other rational-economic models seems fruitful.  
Second, the empirical evidence of this dissertation shows that exit is not the mirror image of 
entry. The dynamics of multimarket entry strategies differ in important ways from the patterns 
observed in the study of exit rates. Moreover, another contribution made by this dissertation is an 
explicit focus on under-performing firms. Across social sciences studies, there is an historical 
emphasis on growth-related issues (Anheier et al. 1999). Within strategy field, scholars have 
extensively investigated causes of above-average returns and consequences of improved 
performance for firms (Barney and Arikan 2001). However, a greater emphasis on expansion and 
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high financial performance raises serious heterogeneity issues, as understanding both causes of 
contraction in the scope and how under-performing firms compete should be equally relevant.  
Third, this study has implications for research in geographic and product diversification. 
Empirical research on geographic and product diversification has largely evolved as individual 
streams of research. Geographic diversification has been an area of interest for international 
strategy scholars as they examine entry into other countries, and geographic expansion is also an 
important area in organization theory. In the realm of corporate strategy, the study of 
diversification has heavily relied on product markets, perhaps due to availability of archival data 
(e.g. SIC codes). Although treated as separate phenomena in the research community, these two 
dimensions are likely to be jointly considered when managers make decisions about the firm‟s 
scope. Hence, these dimensions have to be considered simultaneously when examining 
diversification. Only looking one or the other neither reflects the external market nor the way 
that managers view the competitive landscape. Indeed, as noted by D‟Aveni (2001, p. 4)  
“At corporate and divisional headquarters or within marketing departments, managers work to stake 
out their product positioning on parts of the geographic space. No matter whether you are a CEO or 
brand manager, you compete and cooperate to win the most attractive geo-product markets, and you 
do so as part of a larger system comprised of many rivals with varying amounts of strong and weak 
territories, and hence varying degrees of power.”  
This dissertation attempts to capture some of this tension and struggle that managers face in 
organizations, contributing with a more complete picture of corporate strategic decisions.  
Finally, this dissertation contributes to research on the antecedents of corporate strategy. As 
with any strategic decision, diversification and divestment decisions are not made in a vacuum; 
the competitive context in which firms are involved influence how they expand and contract their 
business scope. While research in corporate strategy has greatly advanced our understanding of 
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the role of firm-specific resources and capabilities in acquisitions and other business scope 
decisions, the impact of the competitive context is largely unexplored. Multimarket competition 
research can offer a framework for examining the influence of competitors on those decisions. 
For instance, a firm‟s acquisition or internal development of a new business unit may have 
motives other than excess capacity or core competences. In fact, Microsoft is currently facing 
this issue, as Apple‟s competition is forcing it to open its own retail stores (Wall Street Journal, 
2009). My dissertation fills this important gap in corporate strategy literature, by showing that a 
multimarket perspective applied to corporate strategy provides explanations for interaction 
between firms that share common markets. Accordingly, I lend support to the claim that 
“corporate strategy decisions can only be imperfectly understood if competitive interaction is not 
taken into account” (McGrath, Chen, & MacMillan, 1998, p. 724). 
 
Empirical implications 
This dissertation also provides empirical contributions. The dataset I used provide depth of 
information regarding entry and exit behavior without resorting to changes in SIC code 
membership or changes in ownership (e.g. acquisition announcements and divestitures). 
Consequently, I was able to capture exit decisions that occurred well before a formal divestiture 
or dissolution would eventually occur.  
My research design also successfully addresses several issues from past research in 
multimarket competition. First, I tested the theoretical model in a well established industry. 
Greve (2000) argued that future research should examine scope decisions made in other 
competitive contexts, focusing on recent data and on mature industries. Second, I was able to 
calculate multimarket contact in a meaningful way, by weighing the markets by strategic 
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importance. Boeker et al. (1997) suggested that markets weighed by importance better reflect the 
real conditions under which managers make business scope decisions. Third, by using geo-
product markets, this dissertation provides a strong test of mutual forbearance logic. Taking 
together, these research efforts help strengthen the theoretical validity of the multimarket 
construct and theory. 
This dissertation also contributes to research on behavioral foundations of strategic 
management. This study replicated Audia and Greve (2006), strengthening the validity of their 
results and the applicability of their method to test the March-Shapira (1992) shifting-focus of 
risk taking. Researchers are strongly encouraged to follow these prescriptions in studies that 
examine the role of organizational context in the reaction to performance feedback.  
The theoretical model developed in this dissertation posed enormous challenges to research 
design. The model hypothesized the moderating effect of spline functions as well as the effects 
of two-way interactions on inverted curvilinear relationships, situations that are seldom, if ever, 
examined in strategic management research. Thus, this dissertation contributes with an 
innovative research design suitable for the study of behavioral implications of rational-economic 
models.  
 
Managerial implications 
This study has several managerial contributions. The results are supported by data from the 
service industry, that is to say, the study departs from a focus on capital-intensive industries (e.g. 
manufacturing, airlines) to a focus on an information-intensive industry, which is in an important 
sector of the economy. Managers will be better informed about how managers in service 
industries make business scope decisions at the light of their firms‟ competitive environment. 
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Indeed, some authors suggest that the competitive interaction, and, by extension, the source of 
competitive advantage in service and manufacturing industries might be different (Korn and 
Baum 2001).  
For a practitioner, the results should also make one wary of relying on the original mutual 
forbearance predictions that competitors with high levels of multimarket contact would forbear 
from entering new markets. My model help managers make informed predictions about a rival‟s 
likelihood of attack in their current market domains, by showing that under-performing firms 
deviate from the traditional logic. Consequently, they can be proactive, outsmarting potential 
entrants with acquisition or internal development strategies in less targeted markets. On the other 
hand, managers can expect that high-performing firms will be more likely abide by the tacit 
agreements with competitors. 
 
7.2 Limitations and opportunities for future research 
My theory did not rely on any idiosyncratic characteristic of the insurance industry and, 
therefore, the theoretical predictions should generalize to other industries. However, the 
multiplier effects may vary across industries. Accordingly, Stephan et al. (2003) noted that the 
inflection point is likely to vary across industries.  
Furthermore, the U.S. insurance industry is regulated at the state and federal levels, a 
situation that may affect the baseline hazard of market entry and exit. However, it is not clear 
that this would produce coefficient biases in the direction of the results. 
There remains much room for future study. Studies incorporating a larger sample, a sample 
from different industries, or one with more control variables will certainly be invaluable for 
replication purposes. It would be also important that future studies follow the operationalization 
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of variables used in this study (e.g. multimarket contact weighted by strategic importance and 
normalized measures of organizational slack). This prescription would greatly advance research 
in this area, as researchers would be able to compare results across different empirical settings.  
This dissertation has offered a behaviorally-based perspective of multimarket competition 
with respect to entry and exit decisions. It would be interesting to look at other aspects of 
competitive dynamics and see whether firms deviate from mutual forbearance predictions with 
respect to those decisions.  
Much of the existing research in multimarket competition has relied solely on secondary and 
archival data sources. As a result, multimarket competition research links the observed 
multimarket structure to the observed market entry and exit behavior, bypassing some 
unobserved behavioral decision-making issues. It is fruitful that future research use primary data 
collected from key decision makers.  This approach can provide a complement to archival 
approaches as it captures issues facing managers in market entry and exit decisions.  
Another important extension of this study is to examine the performance consequences of 
the behavioral model of multimarket competition. Do risk-seeking firms that deviate from the 
mutual forbearance predictions enhance their financial performance? Are risk-averse firms able 
to survive or do they become frozen into patterns of low performance? Examination of these 
questions can shed light in the nature of competitive dynamics under conditions of adversity and 
ambiguity.   
This study is among the first to examine market entry and exit across two dimensions of the 
firm‟s business scope, geographic and product markets. Because such decisions are at the core of 
corporate strategy, future research should examine the patterns of diversification with respect to 
these dimensions, as well as explore the effects of such patterns on firm performance.  
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To advance research, we, as researchers, are challenged to investigate and understand the 
nature of the interactions and interdependencies that drive collective phenomena (Morgeson & 
Hofmann, 1999). It is hoped that my theoretical framework and research design can help guide 
and inspire further work on this direction.  
 
 
  135 
Table 6.1 – Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Market Entry 
  Variables Mean s.d. min max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Entry 0.03 0.16 0 1            
2. MMC 0.73 0.13 0.25 1.00 0.02           
3. Market concentration 0.14 0.04 0.06 0.31 -0.02 0.22          
4. Market attractiveness 1.61 1.34 0 10 0.02 -0.03 -0.09         
5. Market density 35.61 9.62 12 62 0.04 -0.35 -0.44 0.21        
6. Market experience 20.87 11.68 1 101 0.09 0.13 0.08 -0.01 -0.22       
7. Entry experience 1.42 3.80 0 32 0.09 0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.22      
8. Firm size 20.73 1.58 15.76 25.59 0.03 -0.04 0.04 -0.05 -0.14 0.53 0.06     
9. Mutual firm 0.18 0.38 0 1 -0.04 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.09 -0.09 0.07    
10. Performance above aspiration level 0.06 0.10 0.00 1.31 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.05 0.03 0.01 -0.02   
11. Performance below aspiration level -0.05 0.11 -1.21 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.07 0.05  
12. Slack 1.67 0.38 0 3.19 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.04 -0.14 0.00 -0.01 0.14 -0.04 0.10 
|r| > .01 implies significance at p < .05. 
These statistics are calculated on data covering 55,963 firm-market-year observations on multimarket firms making 1,430 market entry moves between 1998 and 2008. 
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Table 6.5 – Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Market Exit 
  Variables Mean s.d. min max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Exit 0.07 0.25 0.00 1            
2. MMC 0.78 0.08 0.28 1 -0.03           
3. Market concentration 0.14 0.04 0.06 0.31 0.01 0.23          
4. Market density 41.48 8.47 12 62 0.00 -0.39 -0.33         
5. Market attractiveness 1.73 1.38 0 10 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 0.22        
6. Market experience 23.47 18.43 1 102 -0.08 -0.16 0.09 -0.15 -0.01       
7. Entry experience 2.22 6.64 0 32 0.00 -0.04 0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.01      
8. Firm size 22.44 1.61 15.76 25.59 -0.04 -0.07 0.03 -0.12 -0.05 0.58 -0.08     
9. Mutual firm 0.20 0.40 0 1 -0.10 0.05 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.10 0.14    
10. Performance above aspiration level 0.04 0.09 0.00 1.31 0.05 -0.06 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 0.03 0.06 -0.07   
11. Performance below aspiration level -0.04 0.10 -1.21 0.00 -0.10 -0.05 0.01 -0.05 -0.01 0.06 -0.05 0.02 0.07 0.21  
12. Slack 1.55 0.27 0 3.19 -0.13 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.22 -0.01 -0.15 0.26 0.00 0.15 
|r| > .01 implies significance at p < .05. 
These statistics are calculated on data covering 40,224 firm-market-year observations on multimarket firms making 1,789 market exit moves between 1998 and 2008. 
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